JoPo: feelings are more important than stats
JoPo now thinks it is pretty clear that Soria helps the team more as a closer than he would as a starter. Here's the money quote:
"I’m a big believer that statistics, when used properly, can tell you a whole lot about baseball. But it is true, as far as I know, that no statistic can measure the feeling of knowing that you have a game won in the ninth inning."
Forget that Soria in the rotation would mean that either Ponson or Ramirez would be out of the rotation. Forget that it would mean many fewer Runs Allowed for the team. Forget that it would therefore mean more wins for the team (even considering the higher leverage of Soria's approx. 75 ip as a closer). Forget all of that. Because Soria as closer just feels right. I anxiously await his future columns on grit, fire and chutzpah.
almost 3 years ago
Scott McKinney
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he does go on to say
that it’s not measurable. do you think we should try to define someone else as a closer (not farnsworth please god please) before we move him up?
"red bull is amaZing" -Coco Crisp
How do you define someone else as a closer?
It seems like the definition of a closer is someone who gets the 9th inning save opportunities. I wouldn’t hand over a bunch of save opps. to some other relievers before moving Soria to the rotation. That would be a waste of Soria’s talent, and the limited sample of data wouldn’t tell you whether pitcher X or Y would make a good closer. Basically we can look at the stats of current Royals relievers to determine who the next best closer would be, and I think it’s Cruz. I don’t buy into “closer magic” or a “closer mentality.” I think that is a creation of sports media which prefers to overvalue intangibles. The good news is that the Royals have some bullpen depth and multiple options for closer if Soria moved to the rotation (Cruz, Tejeda, Mahay, eventually even Rosa). Of course, this is all moot. Poz was right when he said that the Royals have made their decision on how they are going to use Soria.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 10:41 AM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
i'm less telling
and more asking. but i’m inclined to agree with the fabrication of the culture theory.
"red bull is amaZing" -Coco Crisp
Why is Juan Cruz
One For Seven in career saves opportunities? Could it be there there is something to these ‘myths’ that a) the last 3 outs are the hardest outs to get in a game or b) closing games is reserved for pitchers with a very select mindset? Obviously 7 games isn’t a huge sample size, but it is significant IMO, and since we actually, for once have a position on our roster LOCKED DOWN with an All-World talent, lets not fuck it up by tinkering with ‘what could be’.
(and while this discussion is surely to come up again and again in future off-seasons – rightfully so, it’s not like those that want to move him to SP don’t have an argument -, is there really a point to bringing it up 6 games into a season, when it would be basically impossible to stretch his arm out to do anything BUT close at this point?)
BOOM! ROASTED!
Seven games is a significant sample size?
It is miniscule.
since we actually, for once have a position on our roster LOCKED DOWN with an All-World talent, lets not fuck it up by tinkering with ‘what could be’.
We’ve got a very talented pitcher, let’s not fuck it up by getting half of the value we could get out of him. You know, Alex Gordon could be a great pinch hitter, one of the best in baseball, should we lock down that role for him?
is there really a point to bringing it up 6 games into a season, when it would be basically impossible to stretch his arm out to do anything BUT close at this point?
First, I brought it up because JoPo wrote a column about it. Second, Soria could be stretched out over days/weeks into a starting role. He’s not ready to start tomorrow, but they could start stretching him out tomorrow (theoretically) and he’d be ready to go seven innings in a matter of weeks. It’s not like it’s hard to stretch a pitcher out. Every pitcher does that every year in spring training. And the Yanks did it during the season last year with Joba.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 11:50 AM EDT up reply actions
Cruz has succeeded in 20 of 26 "save opportunities" in his career
Due to the stupid way save situations are defined, a “save opportunity” occurs anytime Cruz enters a game in the seventh or later with a lead of three runs or less. In his career, that has happened 26 times, and 20 times he left with the lead intact (1 actual Save plus 19 Holds).
The “One for Seven” statement is false.
by Gopherballs on Apr 13, 2009 12:00 PM EDT up reply actions 2 recs
Thanks for the info
The 1-for-7 number seemed a little odd.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 12:08 PM EDT up reply actions
My apologies
And it was not my intention to mislead…I had heard the 1-7 from what I deemed a reliable baseball person. I think he must have meant that he has 1 save and 6 blown saves. Either I misheard his remarks, or he was inaccurately quoting the stats.
BOOM! ROASTED!
Yeah, I would guess that the 1 save, 6 blown saves thing is right
But of course he has entered the game in many save situations, but being a setup man, he’s had to hand the ball off to the closer almost all the time. In short, he’s been a very effective short reliever.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 12:22 PM EDT up reply actions
It IS miniscule... however
1-7 in save opportunities is telling, anyway. If it were something like 4-7 or even 3-7, then I wouldn’t even blink, but let’s be realistic. Think of a team that wins 108 games. How often do you think a .667 team will go 1-6 over a seven-game stretch? Not very often. In fact, I’d wager that the majority of teams that win 2/3 of their games don’t have a 1-6 stretch the entire season.
The average MLB save percentage is just about even with that.
So, it may not mean anything, but once again we have the probability issue I discussed in re: spring training stats. Simply put, a guy who’s capable of converting 85% of his save opportunities is going to have a very hard time ever going 1-for-7, as probabilities go.
Of course, this is entirely irrelevant in The Real World, since Cruz isn’t 1-for-7. But that doesn’t impact what I’m addressing here.
This space for rent.
This is a compelling argument.
I think the Royals should consider moving Meche to the 8th inning and Greinke to the 7th. Just think what it would feel like knowing you had the game won going into the 7th.
by Trey Hillman's Chin on Apr 13, 2009 9:45 AM EDT reply actions 5 recs
Brilliant
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Apr 13, 2009 12:22 PM EDT up reply actions
In a mystical trance I also came to this conclusion last season
during a strikingly similar discussion.
D-I batboys, the gift that keeps on giving
I don’t personally know any of them.
However, with my years of reading the works of L. Ron Hoover of the Church of Appliantology, I decided to do an exercise to figure out a new winning strategy for the Royals by tapping this under-utilized source of wisdom.
After subsisting on low-protein gruel all morning, I emerged from my mother’s basement to sit in the sauna (closed the bathroom door, put a towel over the crack, cranked up the shower as hot as it would go. Sat on the toilet [low-protein gruel has a lot of fibre]), and exteriorized.
I was 3 feet back of my head, then I was floating. I began to fly. Through the walls I went. I was like Horatio Caine without the sunglasses, speeding to where I could get the information I needed. After a quick stop at Hemet, CA, I tripled the speed of sound on my way to South Florida. From far above, I spotted a swampy baseball diamond. Lighting there, I spotted the wise man from whom I would gain the knowledge I needed. The older man in the manager’s uniform—he was standing between my disembodied self and the person with whom I needed to speak.
Yes, it was the young man who had the knowledge I needed. His arms were bearing a pair of bats in one hand, a bag of balls in the other. His face was clear and pale (when not spray-tanned, I gathered), yet when he turned around, I could see what appeared to be scores of pimples through his greasy white practice jersey. Why did a batboy need a practice jersey? I had no time to to ponder such questions, however, as my energy for exteriorization was running low. I know not how he sensed by presence.
"Greetings, traveller," he drawled. "I gots here the knowledge you seek."
"You wanna maximize yer pitching talent, right? Well, you gotta tell Moore to stop screwing with yer ‘pen. He’s goin’ backwards. In fact, I thunk it over and I came up with a strategery that will gay-run-tee the Royals will shut the other guys down. Mock it up yourself. If having a real shut-down closer makes the game eight innings, wouldna shut-down set-up guy make it a seven inning game? That what you there had when Zack was setting up for Sora. Let’s carry that reasonin’ out to its logical whatfor. Why not have Meche pitch the seventh? And when Hooch is well-done, he can pitch the sixth! I don’t trust that Bannister fella. He may play the game, but with all the textin’ that fat lil’ fella and the numbers and the nerds in the blogs, I’d trade him fast to free up money what for to re-sign a good defensive first baseman to a big extension. But think about it: Hooch, Meche, Greinke, Soria. That four innings of shut-down relief! I’m not even sure I could hit a rope one out of every six times agin’ those dudes! All you gots to do is get some starters, it doesn’t matter where. John Bale, Kyle Davies, they’ll prolly do. They just needs to go five! And who cares about those parts the game. The closer to the end, the more valuble they is. And you wastin’ ‘em in the beginning of the game! Get those worthless innins’ down to five, and you can gay-run-tee the boys will be dominatin’ like the 1996 Yanks in no time. Hoo-wee!"
I had so many more questions. How would I ever transmit this wisdom to the blog world? Would anyone believe me? After all, although I talked to someone who had played the game a little bit at some point, I had not. As I faded, I faintly heard my interlocutor shouting "….will explode!!! 1111!!!" (That’s right, I heard the 1s.)
It was dark. Three feet back. I was in my body, re-awakening to my limited, meat body. And then I heard a beautiful, shrieking voice.
It was my mother.
"Devil _. Fingers! You in the bathroom AGAIN, boy? I’m here watchin’ my stories and you either on that computer box downstairs or in this bathroom again. You better not be usin’ my nice towels. I know what you do in there!"
I was home.
OMG Banny. FWIW I am only crdtng u w/3 runs allwd bc of DDJ OMFG
by devil_fingers on May 20, 2008 9:55 AM PDT to parent up reply reply actions actions 1 recs
Bringing you more-or-less replacement level analysis and commentary to Driveline Mechanics and elsewhere since sometime in 2008.
by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 1:30 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
New plan
Inning 1: Tejada
Inning 2: Wright
Inning 3: Farnsworth
Inning 4: Cruz
Inning 5: Mahay
Inning 6: Davies
Inning 7: Meche
Inning 8: Grienke
Inning 9: Soria
With Ponson, HoRam, and Waechter in reserve in case someone gets shelled. The pitchers would only be pitching an inning at a game, so the starters never get tired!
The only problem with this plan is determining if Farnsworth can be trusted with the critical 3rd inning.
You guys laugh at this joke
but I reached the conclusion that baseball is actually headed this direction a while ago. Starters outings are getting shorter and relievers are more and more specialized, especially in the NL. Why not have everyone on your staff available out of the pen? Why limit yourself? You could throw 6-9 pitchers a night and most of them would be available the next night. The ONLY thing holding this back is the 5 innings for a starter to get the win rule. I don’t necessarily agree with it, it just seems like a natural evolution of the game from where we are at today.
When I see Soria actually throw out of the windup
then I will consider him a possible rotation option.
I don't know how to put this but I'm kind of a big deal.
Do you doubt that he can throw out of windup? It’s not like it’s difficult. And why is throwing out of a windup important? If he can get good velocity, movement and control out of throwing out of the stretch, why is throwing out of the windup better?
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 10:55 AM EDT up reply actions
It's not that it's hard from a technical standpoint
But, for instance, Chamberlain yesterday was a lot different pitcher with runners on and throwing from the windup
by sterlingice on Apr 13, 2009 10:58 AM EDT up reply actions
Then Soria could just stay in the stretch. Does he need to pitch out of the windup? We know he’s got good stuff and control from the stretch, why change? And typically, pitchers have more difficulty pitching from the stretch than from the windup. If Soria is good from the stretch, then is there any reason to believe he’d have difficulty from the windup?
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 11:01 AM EDT up reply actions
He doesn't have to pitch out of the windup
but until I actually see it then I doubt they are even thinking about making the change. Until then it is just the same old boring debate. Soria can handle the spot in the rotation(eventually), Cruz can handle the closer spot, there are young options that should be ready this year to fill Cruz’ spot but currently the FO/Mgr aren’t talking about the change much that we know of.
If they are gonna try it, then they need to start stretching his innings rather soon. Soria needs to throw at least 90 + innings this year if they are gonna move him.
I don't know how to put this but I'm kind of a big deal.
Derek Lowe pitches almost exclusively out of the stretch
and it hasn’t prevented him from being a very effective SP.
Just saying.
Why does he need to?
Why can he not pitch out of the stretch all day? It makes screw all difference, the actual mechanics of pitching are identical. If he is happy in the stretch, let him pitch from the stretch.
The Allard Baird of incisive internet discourse.
by kcbottom9th on Apr 13, 2009 11:36 AM EDT up reply actions
Yeah, no offense
but this is boneheaded. :)
It makes a difference if a pitcher who is fine in the windup cannot pitch from the stretch, because pitchers often need to pitch from the stretch; it makes no difference whatsoever if a pitcher who is fine in the stretch cannot pitch from the windup, because a pitcher never ever has to pitch from the windup. What you’re saying, to offer an anal goe, is that even having a fully-outfitted kitchen, you wouldn’t hire a cook who you never saw use a microwave even though you’re perfectly comfortable with his ability to use a stove.
This space for rent.
I never said he can't pitch from
it. 99% of starters throw from the windup, if he is gonna be changing anytime soon he probably should be adjusting what he does slightly. Until then this debate is old, tired and wore out. No one ever brings up that he tosses about 89-90 as Rany pointed out most starters lose a couple mph starting. He better be pretty damn good to live with a 86-87 mph fastball.
I don't know how to put this but I'm kind of a big deal.
No one ever brings up that he tosses about 89-90 as Rany pointed out most starters lose a couple mph starting. He better be pretty damn good to live with a 86-87 mph fastball.
First, the Pitch f/x data shows that his average fastball velocity has been right round 91 mph in the majors. Second, pitchers usually lose 1-2 mph when the move to a starting role. That would take his average FB velocity down to something like 89-90. This has been discussed many times on this site in the context of Soria moving to the rotation. That’s one of the reasons he’s not likely to pitch like an ace as a starter. He’s not going to be just as effective as a SP as he has been as a closer. That’s a given.
Until then this debate is old, tired and wore out.
I’m sorry it doesn’t meet the high standards of your anti-Teahen rants.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 5:41 PM EDT up reply actions
I’m sorry it doesn’t meet the high standards of your anti-Teahen rants.
I think this is the third time this has been debated since my last Teahen rant. I’m just trying to balance out the anti-new guys crowd who are constantly bashing Olivo, Guillen and Jacobs
I don't know how to put this but I'm kind of a big deal.
I'm going to have to decline
your anal goe offer.
by SpfldDiehard on Apr 13, 2009 5:39 PM EDT up reply actions
I would love to see a study
This does seem like it has one of those numbers that hasn’t been measured yet. Not quite in Poz’s words, but I think there’s something to having less blown saves that hasn’t been quantified in stats yet. And, yes, it’s based on gut feel but I’d love to see someone comb through the numbers and either prove me wrong or right.
Yes, the cliche goes that momentum is only as good as the next day’s starting pitcher. However, it seems that many times after the Royals blow a save, the offense goes into the funk, almost thinking “well, they’re just going to blow it so why bother”.
Sure, the Royals won the next two games in Chicago but only on the backs of great pitching performances. The offense didn’t do a thing until yesterday. However, that’s just one anecdote and there can always be mitigating factors- but think of those blown saves that burn in our mind like the ones during the really long losing streaks where the streak went on that much longer. But, again, those are the ones that stick with us and may not be representative.
So I would propose that to tease these numbers out- check out offensive output for 3, 5, and 7 days after a blown save versus under “normal” non-blown save circumstances over a fairly large data set of blown saves. It would probably need to be league-wide numbers as even bad bullpen teams only get a dozen or two blown saves a year. Also, if there were a way to pick out the more high leveraged BS’s (i.e. only count them if they’re in the 8th or 9th as a 6th inning BS doesn’t mean nearly as much), that would help get better numbers.
Again, a lot of people have “feelings” based on silly superstition. But some of them might be based on facts that just haven’t been discovered yet.
by sterlingice on Apr 13, 2009 10:57 AM EDT reply actions 1 recs
Sure, the Royals won the next two games in Chicago but only on the backs of great pitching performances.
Exactly. Add Soria to the rotation and you’d have even more good pitching performances. How good does Meche-Greinke-Davies-Soria sound at this point?
So I would propose that to tease these numbers out- check out offensive output for 3, 5, and 7 days after a blown save versus under "normal" non-blown save circumstances over a fairly large data set of blown saves.
That would be interesting, but I’d bet my life that over a large sample of data, you’d see no difference in hitting after blown saves.
The one argument that at one point I halfway bought into was that having a good closer helps starting pitchers pitch better because they don’t feel like they have to get everything perfect in order for their team to win the game. The theory went that starters would then throw free and easy and would be more willing to challenge hitters and not nibble or be afraid to throw strikes. But I’ve seen at least two studies done comparing SP performances with good closers as compared to with poor closers (a large sample of data over many years) and both studies found no difference (actually one study found that the SP’s with poor closers pitched just a little better, but the difference was probably statistically insignificant).
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 11:07 AM EDT up reply actions
I'm not disagreeing
I think this year especially I’d be curious to see a Meche-Greinke-Davies-Soria-Hochevar rotation. That would top anything in the central hands down. Cruz is the new closer, Mahay pitches the 8th like he did most of last year, Farnsworth is in the 7th. But are you comfortable if any of them go down with having Tejada or Waechter pitching the 7th? Or Farnsworth the 8th? Probably not, but, on the whole- the pitching staff is probably better with Soria in the rotation. Especially considering how bad our 4 and 5 are.
by sterlingice on Apr 13, 2009 12:45 PM EDT up reply actions
A small tweak
Cruz is the new closer, Mahay pitches the 8th like he did most of last year, Farnsworth is in the 7th. But are you comfortable if any of them go down with having Tejada or Waechter pitching the 7th? Or Farnsworth the 8th?
If we’re talking about traditional bullpen roles (and since we’re talking about the real world of MLB, I’ll stick to that), then I’d go with:
Closer – Tejeda
8th inn. – Mahay/Tejeda
7th inn. – Farnsworth/Bale/Waechter
I actually really like Tejeda. While he gives up some walks, he’s a strikeout machine. I really see him as Cruz-lite. And if someone goes down, then Carlos Rosa can be called up and I really think he’d be one of the best relievers in the pen. I like that bullpen. Is it as good as with Soria in it? No. But is it still a pretty good bulllpen? I think so.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 12:50 PM EDT up reply actions
where's cruz?....
is he supposed to be closing? you have two tejedas, so im guessing thats where he belongs. That works for me…and is what SHOULD be done if were out of contention by july
TPJ...you're dead to me
by billybeingbilly on Apr 13, 2009 1:14 PM EDT up reply actions
Whoops
That should be Cruz as the closer.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 1:18 PM EDT up reply actions
Point of order
For all we know, if Soria was in the rotation, we would be 1-5 or 2-4 instead of 3-3.
Don’t misunderstand, I think he’d be a valuable starter. The argument, in the end, is actually more relevant when put this way: there is extreme value to be had in having a guy you can count on (almost) every day as opposed to only every fifth day. We get too wrapped up in the volume of innings without considering leverage.
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The numbers have been crunched over and over again
It isn’t just about the number of innings. The numbers have been crunched over and over by better sabermetricians than me (and then I’ve crunched my own as well) and these calculations take leverage into account. Considering that, considering that Soria likely won’t be as effective as a SP as he is as a closer and you still have significantly more value with Soria as a SP (dependent on how much his effectiveness drops off, which requires actually trying him in that role). When you take into account who Soria would be replacing in the rotation and who would replace him at closer, the picture looks even better for the Royals with Soria as a starter.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 5:15 PM EDT up reply actions
I find their work lacking.
See my lengthy comment below. They’re attempting to model the unmodelable.
This space for rent.
This is a mischaracterization of Poz's argument
Poz clearly lays out the mechanical arguments for moving Soria to the rotation or keeping him in the bullpen (innings vs effectiveness) and then adds that there is also an emotional argument in terms of how Soria’s presence improves team confidence. I’m all for providing numbers to support an argument whenever possible, and I’m certainly quick to point out logical holes, but I think we’ve gone too far when merely mentioning a decision’s impact on team confidence is deserving of critique. As Royals fans, we’ve all seen enough long losing streaks to know that team confidence does affect team performance.
by kcdc1 on Apr 13, 2009 11:14 AM EDT reply actions 2 recs
Not a mischaracterization in the least
He points to the numbers, but then says that the intangibles trump the numbers.
I’m all for providing numbers to support an argument whenever possible, and I’m certainly quick to point out logical holes, but I think we’ve gone too far when merely mentioning a decision’s impact on team confidence is deserving of critique.
JoPo does more than mention the pyschological element. He basically says that his guesstimate of the psychological value of having a shutdown closer trumps the numbers which weigh heavily in the other direction. His opinion which is based solely on gut-level analysis was very much deserving of criticism.
As Royals fans, we’ve all seen enough long losing streaks to know that team confidence does affect team performance.
Yes, and Soria would actually likely help the Royals win more games. Wouldn’t that help team confidence? And how much of an opportunity does a closer have to end losing streaks? Not much. When the Royals went through that horrendous 12-game losing streak last year, Soria couldn’t come into the game in the 9th inning, get three strikeouts and manufacture a win for the team. But if he’d made a couple of starts in that streak, he could have pitched really well and genuinely given the Royals a chance to end the losing streak.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 11:22 AM EDT up reply actions
Disagree
It’s a “Soria’s awesome” piece. It’s not really about starter vs closer. Posnanski doesn’t even make a strong conclusion unless you want to count, “The Royals have definitively made their choice. And on days like Sunday, that choice feels right.”
Posnanski sets up the argument as “more innings” vs “the game is over.” I think that’s probably a mischaracterization of the elements at play because it doesn’t take into account the question of whether Soria would be effective as a starter, but you’re not going to put that stuff into this type of column.
I think the problem is that you’re taking it as serious analysis of the starter vs closer debate when really it’s about how Soria struck out the side and his awesomeness gives the team confidence. There’s nothing wrong with saying that it’s nice to have Soria in the bullpen on days when you have a tentative lead in the 9th.
by kcdc1 on Apr 13, 2009 11:41 AM EDT up reply actions 2 recs
I think this is spot on
I think NYRoyal is reading too much into this article.
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by kcbottom9th on Apr 13, 2009 11:48 AM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
It’s a "Soria’s awesome" piece. It’s not really about starter vs closer.
Are you kidding? He’s talking about the issue of starter vs. closer throughout the column. It starts in the title, but I’ll disregard that, because columnists often don’t write their own titles. Then he talks about it in the first paragraph (and, indeed, the first sentence). And then it’s in the second paragraph, and throughout the piece. The article is all about starter vs. closer for Soria. He sets up the issue from the beginning of the column, discusses the issues involved and comes to the conclusion that the great feeling of having a shutdown closer is more important than the numbers.
There’s nothing wrong with saying that it’s nice to have Soria in the bullpen on days when you have a tentative lead in the 9th.
Except that isn’t what the column was about at all. It was about the starter vs. closer issue, which he discusses throughout.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 11:54 AM EDT up reply actions
"Say it ain't so, Joe!"
Ban me if you must, but I couldn’t resist saying that. Anyway, NYRoyal is absolutely correct here. Joe Posnanski is one of the greatest sportswriters alive – I’ve read his book about Buck O’Neil, and its terrific – but this column is horrifying. Joe admirably admits that his generation was brainwashed by RBI, AVG, HR, but he can’t realize that he’s also been brainwashed about the value of a closer. Basically, a Hall of Famer-calibre closer is only worth about 2.5 WAR per year over any particular long-term timeframe. That means that, any given year, you should expect Papelbon or Rivera to be worth about as much as your average #3 starter. Mariner fans have been absolutely traumatized by this – we’ve ended up, somehow, drafting three closers in a row with our first round draft pick. M’s fans on LL are not amused. Unless you’re in the thick of a late-season pennant race, Soria belongs in the rotations even it means having Bobby Ayala close for you.
It seems that M’s fans and Royals fans have been fated by destiny to suffer together – in the same ways and with the same cast of characters (Olivo, Guillen, Bloomquist, HoRam, etc.).
I really like Joe
He’s a very good sports writer and he’s fun to read on all sorts of subjects. But of course this doesn’t mean that his analysis on all of the X’s and O’s is going to be terrific. And I think this column was a big miss.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 1:20 PM EDT up reply actions
The problem is
that if a Soria is worth two-three wins over the average starting pitcher, then his replacement as closer had better be no worse than two-three wins worse.
I think anyone who recalls those halcyon days of yore when the Royals blew 30 saves a season can very quickly grasp why all the arguments relating to overall value aren’t entirely valid. If moving Soria to the rotation results in just ten more blown saves — and this isn’t even particularly outlandish, given the difference between Soria’s save% and league average — his move to the rotation absolutely must result in a 10-game “positive” performance over the starter he’s evicting from the rotation. Just remember, even a Joakim Soria is going to have to hand games over to the bullpen he’s no longer anchoring.
Indeed, in a world where a team can blow 30 saves while another team blows three, I’m thinking that perhaps the mathematics involved in determining “value” may just be a wee bit off, and people need to stop reading them as gospel. They’re statistical determinations based on medians, and they’re very hard to model. Hell, you can’t even really work up a simulation in Diamond Mind to see what the difference between Soria as a starter with Cruz as closer vs. Soria as closer is, because nobody has the faintest idea how either man would really perform in that role. The act of pitching 5+ innings every fifth day is NOT the same as pitching 1+ inning a few times a week, neither physically nor strategically nor psychologically.
Having said all that, if you’ve got someone you can use as a closer who’s very close to as good as Soria, then it’s no problem — but, of course, then the question becomes “why don’t we make him our fifth starter? Boy, that’d be awesome!” It’s an endless circle wherein we deconstruct the argument to “what’s the point of having good relievers if they’d be better as starters?”
Again, I’m agnostic on the question, personally. I don’t think having Soria in the rotation would destroy the team, nor do I think it would result in unicorn giggles, perpetual rainbows, and 95 wins. I just think there’s entirely too much “OMG we have to have a closer for the psychological impact” AND entirely too much “take the tangent of the cosine” going on here, without a full consideration of the factors in the middle.
This space for rent.
by jonfmorse on Apr 13, 2009 5:19 PM EDT up reply actions 2 recs
It seems like you’re saying that you should only move your great closer if you have someone who is very close to as good as that great closer, regardless of how much improvement that great closer is over the person he’s replacing in the rotation. Did you see my article on relative WAR of great closers as opposed to starters? Here’s a quick theoretical breakdown:
Closer – Soria – 2.7 WAR (and that is if he is a dominant closer, pitching better than he did last year)
5th SP – Ramirez/Bannister/etc. 1.5 WAR (and this is a generous number)
TOTAL 4.2 WAR
Closer – Cruz – 1.7 WAR (and that’s with him being a good, but certainly not great closer)
5th SP – Soria – 3.7 WAR (projecting Soria to be a #2-quality SP, but not as good as Meche has been)
TOTAL 5.2 WAR
Basically, without Soria being a world beater as a SP or Cruz being a dominant closer, the Royals still get more value with Soria in the rotation.
I don’t know how many of the closer vs. starter studies you’ve read, but I think you are giving them short shrift. They account for a wide variety of factors, leverage included.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 5:31 PM EDT up reply actions
Still doesn't work for me.
First, I think that’s grossly overrating Soria as a starter, at least from the get-go.
But let’s ignore that. Last season, Soria saved 42 games, and had 3 blown saves. If you really think that Juan Cruz would go 41-4 in 45 save opportunities, then fine; I will accept that the 1.0 WAR difference between the two configurations is valid.
Herein lies the problem: I don’t think Juan Cruz would go 41-4 in 45 save opportunities. I think it more likely he’d go something like 37-8, which is still not shabby at all — but it’s five games worse than Soria while Soria is not five games better than (whomever). (Actually, when you take into account the possibility of still winning a game with a blown save, it may only be three or four games worse, but that’s still not an improvement.) This is why I take issue with simply using WAR to try and make this sort of determination, because if you do use it alone like this, it doesn’t work.
Or rather, WAR doesn’t work for closers, taking a second look at it.
If Soria has a 2.7 WAR in a better season than last year — a year in which he converted 42 of 45 save opportunities… while the average save percentage is around 67% (30 of 45), would you please be kind enough to explain to me how 12 non-blown saves equates to a mere 2.7 WAR? Seriously? No, you can’t, because it’s nonsensical. Joakim Soria recorded saves and secured wins for the Royals last year 12 times where the average major-league pitcher would have either lost the game or at least forced the offense to go back to work, most likely resulting in 8 more losses (teams lose blown save games about 2/3 of the time as well).
There is something wrong with either the math itself, or the application of it.
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Do you know that WAR for pitchers includes leverage in its calculation?
I think you are wildly overvaluing Saves, especially since many of them are in low and moderate leverage situations.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 5:54 PM EDT up reply actions
Of COURSE I know that.
Did YOU know that 12 blown saves leading to (on average) 8 losses is more than 2.5 wins? It’s true! 8 is a larger number than 2.5.
I realize this math stuff is hard sometimes, but you’re really overcomplicating something very simple. An average reliever is better than a replacement reliever, and the 2008 Royals won at least six games, and as many as twelve, which they would not have won with an “average” closer. With a replacement-level closer, those numbers are even higher.
Therefore, Joakim Soria as a closer was most certainly NOT worth 2.5 wins above replacement under any sensible definition of “wins.” The math involved in determining WAR for closers is incontrovertibly WRONG, and by adhering to it as gospel, you are in error. It’s as simple as that, and continuing to argue it is very much akin to trying to tell me that the Bible is the Word of God because the Bible says it is the Word of God.
By the way: not one single advanced metric has reached the level of scientific theory. You cannot write a proof with any of them. This doesn’t mean that I am all of a sudden telling you that advanced metrics are bullshit; on the contrary, I think they’re vastly more instructive than anything a former ballplayer has to say on a topic certainly, and for major-league players they’re more telling than scouting reports. But we have to recognize that they are unproven hypotheses, only “accurate” to within some standard deviation and still clearly flawed in various ways.
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Somebody poked the condescension bear with a pointed stick
I didn’t create WAR. I didn’t even perfect it (nor is it perfect). Sabermetricians much, much, much better than I did that. Guys like Tom Tango apparently overcomplicated WAR for relief pitchers and are apparently “incontrovertibly WRONG.” (I’m guessing all caps wrong is even more wrong than lower case wrong). And no, I don’t just regurgitate WAR. I’ve actually read a hell of a lot about it and I recognize that it accounts for a relief pitcher’s value much better than giving a closer credit for a win with every save and a loss for every blown save (or anything even approximating that).
By the way: not one single advanced metric has reached the level of scientific theory. You cannot write a proof with any of them. This doesn’t mean that I am all of a sudden telling you that advanced metrics are bullshit; on the contrary, I think they’re vastly more instructive than anything a former ballplayer has to say on a topic certainly, and for major-league players they’re more telling than scouting reports. But we have to recognize that they are unproven hypotheses, only "accurate" to within some standard deviation and still clearly flawed in various ways.
Correct. But I don’t think you’ve found a flaw in WAR for relief pitchers. Not at all. And if you’re going to say that many of the best sabermetricians have really blown it, you’re going to have to bring more than your conclusion that it just isn’t intuitive to you. You are overvaluing saves and blown saves in the extreme.
But as you have found something which you are certain is incontrovertibly wrong, I think you should e-mail Tom Tango and let him know how far off he is. He’s on SB Nation and stops by this blog every now and then. I think he’d have some interesting thoughts for you.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 7:29 PM EDT up reply actions
Yes, someone poked the condescension bear with a stick.
I wish you’d learn to dodge it, O “Did you know?”
Again, you miss the point, and rely on your religion for answers. If a metric tells me that a closer is worth 2.5 wins over replacement, yet it is clearly apparent that the team won far more than 2.5 games as a direct result of utilizing the player in question as opposed to the average player, then there is something wrong with the actual value of the metric in question for the purposes of asking the question you’re trying to answer. If the team will lose 8 extra games because Soria’s no longer the closer, but he will contribute an extra 1-2 WAR as a starter, that’s a losing bet — unless WAR itself has no actual meaning in regard to expected wins.
It is not necessary for me to “find a flaw” in WAR in the way you’re suggesting I should. I am not investigating the details of the formula looking for the error; I am pointing out a situation where it simply does not work — at least not for the purposes you are attempting to apply. I do not know why it doesn’t work. You’re basically telling me that if I notice that a bunch of 2009 Dodge Chargers have transmission problems, why, who am I to question the work of dedicated automotive engineers who quite clearly know much more than I do about designing a transmission?
Here’s one problem, though. Randomly looking over win expectancies, it appears to me that the win expectancy for most save situations exceeds the actual save percentage. It could be that win expectancy is being improperly calculated, it could be that I’m just wrong about that particular detail, or it could simply be that a lot of relief pitchers really suck, thereby artificially lowering the actual save percentage below true win expectancy.
And I’m not denigrating Tom’s work here. I think it’s fascinating and fun and ironically I’m 100% convinced of its efficacy in measuring hitting. Just not so sure about the pitching part.
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Again, you miss the point, and rely on your religion for answers.
No, I’ve studied this metric and find it’s methodology much better than your feel for the value of a save.
If a metric tells me that a closer is worth 2.5 wins over replacement, yet it is clearly apparent that the team won far more than 2.5 games as a direct result of utilizing the player in question as opposed to the average player, then there is something wrong with the actual value of the metric in question for the purposes of asking the question you’re trying to answer.
Ok, if a pitcher gets 40 saves and has 5 blown saves, with a 3.50 FIP, how many games did his performance win over a replacement player? Clearly the answer isn’t 35, so how do you quantify it. It appears that your answer is “I don’t know, but I know 2.5 isn’t right.” You’re going to have to do better than to assert that 2.5 clearly is incontrovertibly wrong. What is the proper quantification, then? And if you assert 2.5 is incorrect, wouldn’t you have to know what goes into the WAR calculation and discover where it is flawed?
You’re basically telling me that if I notice that a bunch of 2009 Dodge Chargers have transmission problems, why, who am I to question the work of dedicated automotive engineers who quite clearly know much more than I do about designing a transmission?
That is a horrible analogy. In your analogy, those cars clearly have a problem. In this case, you are arguing that there is a problem with WAR, at least for closers. That is anything but apparent. The fact that it feels wrong to you does not prove that there is indeed a problem. A lot of good sabermetric minds have looked into this and I don’t believe they agree with you on this problem. They may well be wrong, but you’d have to actually find and explain the flaw, as opposed to just asserting that it must be there because you don’t like the results the metric puts out.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 8:09 PM EDT up reply actions
Wow.
Scott, to mock me for arguing based on “feel” when I used actual, you know, NUMBERS to demonstrate why I think there’s a flaw? That’s absolutely beneath you.
The funniest thing of all? Someone else actually pointed out the flaw in my argument. You didn’t; you were too busy working up ways to accuse me of relying on my obviously inferior intuition rather than succumbing to the holy light of unprovable theory. A theory which can’t even properly be modeled in order to judge its efficacy since you can’t even take Soria’s Strat-O-Matic card and make him a starter and run a million simulations to see if you’re right. Because, you know, being a starter is physically, tactically, and psychologically different than being a reliever.
Oh, wait… there I go again with that whole idea that players aren’t freakin’ robots who either perform or don’t perform no matter what the situation. My bad!
(And yes, I’m done here.)
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It is about feel...about the numbers
Calm down man. If the numbers are off, then you need to show where the numbers are off. What I got from you was that the numbers seemed like they must be wrong (or, in your words, that they were incontrovertibly wrong). I wanted to know how. I wanted to know what was wrong about how relief pitcher WAR was figured. Are the run-win values off? Is the leverage calculation wrong? It would have been different if you had said that the numbers just seem off and that it is counterintuitive. But instead you just ridiculed the numbers (WAR) as clearly, undeniably, way way off. If so, show me how.
And, they are so robots!
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 10:48 PM EDT up reply actions
Sigh
Soria’s save percentage – MLB save percentage * Soria’s save opportunities = number of saves over the number of saves expected by an average reliever (not replacement, average).
That number, for Soria, is 12, which implies as many as 12 games (but more likely around 8, factoring in games where the team blows the save yet still wins) the Royals won which they would not have won with an average reliever in the closer role. You understand that part? (Be sure to finish reading the whole comment before reacting to whether “12” is the proper number.)
It’s not intuition, it’s simple math. It is not that “a save helps create a win” as you mention below, but that “a failure to save helps create a loss.” The recorded saves indicate games which reached their expected conclusion, whereas the difference between those saves and the league average denote games which the team may have instead lost.
From there, you also consider that a team loses about 2/3 of the games in which they commit a blown save, which is how 12 turns into 8; thus, I concluded — without any feeling or intuition whatsoever — that Soria seemed to me to be worth around 8 wins as the Royals’ closer in 2008. Because of that, it then seemed to me that WAR must have a flaw of some sort if it missed this by a factor of four.
Note that this doesn’t even mean there’s anything “wrong” with WAR; it just means that the application of WAR to answer the question being asked is incorrect. Look at it from another angle: take a player who bats .250, has an OBP of .250, and slugs under .500… but somehow, someway, manages to either single or double and drive in two runs in the eighth or ninth inning of every game, and in every game his team was losing by a run when this plate appearance came around. We’d look at this guy and go, “dude’s got an OPS under .750, stinkeroo.” But the thing is, I am almost positive that WAR would actually inflate his value to an insane level as a result of his 162 totally successful ultra-high leverage plate appearances, simply because WAR is doing what it’s supposed to do. If there is a flaw in WAR, that may actually BE the flaw; that is, there’s nothing at all wrong with the formula, but like any other advanced metric may require some nuance in interpretation. (Obviously, if such a situation occurred in reality, we would look at it and realize that the performance itself was so fluky as to somehow be the basis for choosing MegaMillions numbers and/or solving the mysteries of Lost.) So it’s not that I think there’s something “wrong” with WAR on the face of things, just that I’m not sure it can be interpreted equally for different roles because of the dichotomy between the games Soria actually played a hyper-critical role in winning and his stated WAR.
However, as pointed out to me, the MLB average save percentage includes “one-run lead, seventh inning” as well as “three-run lead, ninth inning.” So some percentage of those save opportunities are not applicable when discussing Soria, a three-out kinda guy. Yet still, even taking that into account, Soria’s save percentage over the average closer’s save percentage generates a number which is well over 2 (around 4, factoring in the “won despite blown save” calculation). So I still believe there to be a disconnect between closer WAR and “actual” win contribution, however small.
That said, because the gap is closed with the new consideration, I think “Soria the Starter plus Cruz as Closer” vs. “Soria the Closer plus Whomever as Starter” is basically a wash; he’d be just about as valuable either way.
Now, to answer the specific questions you pose, my answer is “I’m not sure where it’s off, but I think it most certainly must be off slightly somewhere.” Not because I have a “feeling” or an “intuition,” but because the numbers as I observe them not only do not add up, but do not add up in such a way that the flaw is obvious to me. Whether that flaw is in the metric itself, or in the usage of the metric, or whether something about Soria’s performance, usage, or pure dumb fluky luck is skewing the numbers just as they would skew with our .250 hitter with 162 GWRBI… I have no idea.
It may be something as simple as the fact that a pitcher inherently shares the credit for his success with eight other players on any given plate appearance result, while a hitter — given the situation at hand when he comes to the plate — is then solely credited for his contribution/failure at that point. That in itself would reduce WAR for every pitcher, it seems to me.
And it may be that Soria had an inordinate number of “open the ninth with a three-run lead” appearances. That would reduce his WAR, obviously; the single-game win expectancy for a three-run one-inning save is much higher than, say, coming in with one out in the eighth leading by a run with two men on base.
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Wait, no I'm not.
I just realized what you said: my “feel for the value of a save.”
Saves have no freakin’ value. WINS have value.
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Right
And the question is how much that save helps to create a win. It clearly helps. But by how much?
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 10:48 PM EDT up reply actions
I plead guilty to regurgitation.
I basically just spit back what my betters (Like Tango, Graham MacAree, and Matthew Carruth) stuff into my head. I haven’t been “good” at math since middle school, but I’d wager that Graham and Matthew know a hell of alot more about math than most of us here do. They INVENTED tRA and *tRA , the stat most people who have objetions to FIP and xFIP prefer. And Matthew and Graham all fall in line 100% with NYRoyals on this (at list as they explained in the Morrow post I linked to, whose arguments apply even better to Soria since he doesn’t have diabetes messing with his body). I’m not judging your math skills or trying to shout you down. I think your posts are great and informative. For all I know you could hand Graham and Matthew their asses in a math war, but I’ve never heard of anyone doing that to them ever before.
Nah.
They’d hand me my ass.
See, my problem has absolutely nothing to do with the question of whether Soria should, should not, could, can’t, or might start. It has to do with something I noted regarding the league-wide save percentage as opposed to Soria’s save percentage, and how that appeared not to jibe with WAR.
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That's wrong.
Unless those stats are specifically for 9th inning saves. 30 out of 45 on average likely includes Kyle Farnsworth blowing a “save situation” on opening day in Chicago.
Yeah, well, how many people said Soria should be in then?
Around 67% of save opportunities are converted into saves, period.
For typical ninth-inning-only closers, it appears that the average save percentage is closer to 80% — which still means the Royals won around four games they wouldn’t have with an average closer, given Soria’s high save percentage.
Now, this may be where the numbers start to jibe a little better, especially if one uses “Juan Cruz” rather than “average closer.” In that instance, it looks like pretty much a wash whether you have Soria in the rotation or closing. But there’s still a gap between “actual wins resulting from Soria’s use vs. an average closer” and a 2.5 WAR. A gap of nearly 170%.
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I agree with kcdc1 on JoPo's point herre
I could be wrong, but I too thought the article was more of a “Soria is awesome and this is why the Royals think that he should stay a closer” rather than a “this is why I think he should be a closer rather than a starter.”
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 1:33 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
If it is just a "Soria is awesome" article...
…then why does he spend so much time talking about the starter vs. closer issue. He talks about that throughout the article. It’s not like he makes just one or two offhand references to it. And he concludes by saying why Soria as a dominant closer is better for the team than as a starter. I think your interpretation of this column might be colored by your positive opinion of JoPo. Even though he’s a good writer, sometimes he’s just plain wrong.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 1:39 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
It's possible
I know that I tend to enjoy Posnanski more than you two, and I know I cut him some slack. But I did just read the article, and I just don’t see it as him endorsing the (non-)move as much as “this is why people feel that he’s more valuable as a closer.”
He may actually feel that way, I don’t know. I don’t think it’s clear either way from the article alone.
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 2:14 PM EDT up reply actions
I must be missing something
After reading that column, you don’t think he’s saying that the Royals are better off with Soria as a closer? I think he said it pretty clearly.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:20 PM EDT up reply actions
i didn't want to weigh in until I read the article
But I didn’t even need to get past the headline:
“Hard to argue Soria shouldn’t remain a closer”
Point: NYRoyal
Yes, but it seems that he's landed now
Although if Davies implodes, he could change his mind.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:31 PM EDT up reply actions
I'm with NYRoyal on this one.
Any – and I mean any – who has seen a weeks’ worth of baseball can intuitively grasp the arguments for making Soria a closer. It’s a question of simple human emotion. People’s anxiety doesn’t go up much if you’re down early, but it goes up and up in the late innings. And there’s absolutely nothing more traumatizing for a fan than seeing many your team lose lots of games when it has the lead in the 8th inning (e.g. for me: the 1996 and 1997 Mariners). Posnanski spends almost his entire article essentially buying into this worldview ({baseballview?).
By contrast, he spends one or two sentences explaining why good starting pitchers are more valuable than Hall-of-Fame relief pitchers. Even the most devoted fans can be blind to this until a good article beats them over the head with it. Closers often get more famous than the team’s ace, and people always pay closest attention in the late innings, so why wouldn’t the casual fan think the team’s closer is more valuable than an excellent but unexciting ace or #2? Posnanski has just contributed to the ignorance of most of his readers. It’s not something he does very often – he is a tremendous analyst of baseball statistics usually, and he can explain it in better, clearer prose than almost anyone, but he really screwed over his readers with this column.
what are the projections of a 1.Meche 2.Grienke 3. Davies 4. Soria 5. Hochevar CP Cruz vs. 1.Meche 2. Grienke 3. Davies 4. Ponson 5.Ramirez CP Soria?
My stories a lot like yours only more interesting because it involves robots!
Personally
I think it is impossible to project Soria’s numbers as a starter.
No batter in MLB has ever faced him twice in the same night. Jose Lima, in his brief, magical stint with the Royals had several outings where the guy looked like nails innings 1 – 3, then once guys started seeing him repeatedly, all of a sudden the game went to shit and he would get cuffed around the yard. (note – I am not comparing Mex to LimaTime Mex clearly has beeter ‘stuff’, I’m just merely drawing a paralell. You could insert dozens of pitchers in Lima’s place in my example and a few from our roster – Jamie Wright, Ho-Ram & Tejada have all been effective releivers and effective starters for 3 innings)
I just love how everyone also just forgets that GMDM and other real life talent evaluators have said that they feel like Mex’s mechanics make him a high-injury risk if extended out to sa starters workload. I suppose the counter-argument is that they are all lying to cover their tracks of their terrible decision to leave him as an All-Star closer, I guess that makes sense too (rolls eyes).
BOOM! ROASTED!
I think it is impossible to project Soria’s numbers as a starter.
True, but there is reason to believe he’d succeed as a starter: 1. Multiple good pitches, 2. Good stuff, 3. Good control. Now that doesn’t guarantee SP success. That’s why he’s worth a try at SP. If it doesn’t work out, you move him back to closer.
I just love how everyone also just forgets that GMDM and other real life talent evaluators have said that they feel like Mex’s mechanics make him a high-injury risk if extended out to sa starters workload
First, I don’t think anyone in the Royals organization has said that he’s a “high-injury risk.” But I recognize that there are mechanical issues and that there is some injury risk there. I mentioned that in my most recent Soria-as-starter article. That’s the only real reason to potentially not use him as a starter. But I don’t think that ends the discussion. You know who else has mechanical issues which create significant injury risk? Tim Lincecum. Should they move him to the bullpen? Or should they monitor him closely and watch his pitch counts closely? I think the answer is obvious.
Frankly, if JoPo had said in this article that the big reason Soria should stay in the bullpen is injury risk, then I wouldn’t have given it a second thought. That’s a reasonable argument. What isn’t a reasonable argument is that his sports psychology guesswork shows him that a shutdown closer is more important than the runs saved by having him in the rotation. And I criticized it thusly.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 12:00 PM EDT up reply actions
The weird thing is
If it doesn’t work out, you move him back to closer.
It seems like I’ve seen advocates of the “Soria as closer” position also argue that if he fails as starter he will somehow no longer be able to be the great closer he is now. For the record, I think this is a silly argument without any basis.
The General Theory of Royaltivity
by kabrink on Apr 13, 2009 3:10 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
if it wasn’t for the save stat being made up soria might be a SP already as closers would just be the 9th inning guy instead of the 8th or 7th inning guy
My stories a lot like yours only more interesting because it involves robots!
by AvilesRotY on Apr 13, 2009 11:45 AM EDT reply actions 4 recs
yup.
and if it weren’t for the Rule 5 rules, I’d bet money that if they Royals could have sent Soria to the minors there, he would have started, dominated, and been in the KC rotation by mid-2007/ start 2007.
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 1:35 PM EDT up reply actions
I wonder what the psychological effect is
On only having a chance to win three out of five games?
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by RoyalsRetro on Apr 13, 2009 12:23 PM EDT reply actions 2 recs
But they feel so comfortable in those three games, that a warm, fuzzy feeling extends to the other two games.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 12:46 PM EDT up reply actions
+1
I wasn’t all that keen on Soria being used in the rotation this off season for a couple of reasons. He’s had to have Tommy John surgery and doesn’t exactly have a workhorse build, so there could be significant concern about his ability to remain healthy with the wear and tear of a starter, the fact that he’d have to face batters more times per outing, and that most pitchers have their stuff play up when they move to the bullpen.
It didn’t seem to be worth the risk and effort when we had Hochevar and Bannister occupying the fourth and fifth spots in our rotation.
One factor I haven't heard mentioned
In the Soria as starter v. closer argument is the issue of longevity (and this is coming from a strong supporter of Soria as starter, I’m just playing devil’s advocate). I was wondering today if we couldn’t get a 15 year closer out of him v. a 5 year (or less) career as a starter.
This assumes, of course, that we could lock him up for his career, Mariano-style, which is a wild assumption, but I’ll throw it out anyway.
*You think I'm good* "You know, that Farnsworth is pretty good." *You will give me 9 million dollars* "So, Farnsy, how does $9 million sound?"
by jackie ballgame on Apr 13, 2009 1:45 PM EDT reply actions
maybe...
but I think in the relative short term, the value difference would make it a moot point
do closers have longer careers than SPs really?
That's a good question
I haven’t read anything convincing (although I haven’t really researched it) that says that,all things being equal, being a closer ensures better health/longevity than being a starter. I’m sure people can point to cases where a guy was made or left as a reliever due to “health concerns,” but is there anytihng to back that up besides intuition?
Unless I am forgetting how it went down, I seem to remember a few years ago the Red Sox were going to make Papelbon a starter because a doctor said that closing (i.e., pitching shorter outings more often) was more dangerous to his shoulder. Or did I just dream that (and if I’m dreaming about Jon Papelbon, shoot me now)?
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 2:10 PM EDT up reply actions
Closers generally have a relatively short shelf life
just look at the saves leaderboard from 2005. There are a few notable exceptions like Rivera and Hoffman. The injury analysts suggest there is a larger injury risk with greater percentage of innings in high leverage situations and with the greater effort expended (than they would as starters). The extra times warming up probably do not help either.
I think Soria's pitching complement
makes him a good starting candidate. But, also, he’s not a power pitcher type so much so he also would profile, in my mind, as being someone who could smartly evolve over time and be a long time starter in the Moyer mode.
The General Theory of Royaltivity
Probably shorter
What with all the extra pressure an’all
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It's a good question
But it’s far too complicated to answer. This post helped me grasp just how hard it is to predict pitcher injuries and how extraordinarily unnatural and complex the act of throwing a baseball is. Pitcher abuse points are wildly imperfect. The only thing that’s reasonably reliable (but still makes everything a crapshoot) is a pitcher’s injury history. But the short answer is nobody really knows.
And Mariano Rivera, despite how good he is, would be a clear liability for any team not called the Yankees because of his gargantuan, 8-figure a year salary – he just doesn’t throw anywhere close to enough innings to be as valuable as an all-star starter or position player.
http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=844&position=P#value
That's one important factor for having a career-long closer
They get expensive and cost more than they are worth pretty quickly. If a guy can rack up 35+ saves every year, he’s going to get huge money on the FA market (and not be worth it).
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:50 PM EDT up reply actions
I would say the mileage on a guy's arm who throws
80 innings v. 180 would have to give him a longer career. Closers who blow their arms out are guys who throw 95+ which Soria doesnt do.
*You think I'm good* "You know, that Farnsworth is pretty good." *You will give me 9 million dollars* "So, Farnsy, how does $9 million sound?"
by jackie ballgame on Apr 13, 2009 1:49 PM EDT reply actions
An unrelated comment on JoPo as baseball writer
Since the comment here seems to be that his leaning toward intangible aspects of baseball somehow lessen his qualifications as a baseball writer,
he does a lot of fun things with stats on his blog—actually has fun with stats in a non-metallic way. I know there are a lot of guys out there, me among them, who read stuff about, say, WARP from a more scientific angle and are pretty bored by the presentation. That’s not to say that it’s not good science, but the less scientifically oriented baseball fan likes the fusion of a stat and the stories the stats tell. Bill James is the best in this regard, and with constant references to James, JoPo accomplishes this pretty well.
I think casting him as a touchy-feely non-scientific baseball writer is off the mark.
*You think I'm good* "You know, that Farnsworth is pretty good." *You will give me 9 million dollars* "So, Farnsy, how does $9 million sound?"
by jackie ballgame on Apr 13, 2009 1:57 PM EDT reply actions 1 recs
Correction
Since the comment here seems to be that his leaning toward intangible aspects of baseball somehow lessen his qualifications as a baseball analyst
Fixed.
The title of this fanshot is tongue-in-cheek. Although I think it is an accurate representation of this one article. I’ve read lots stuff from Joe in the Star and on his blog. I know that he’s into stats (although not deep into stats). I know he’s not just touchy-feely. I like his writing, and his baseball analysis is decent. But his strength is in prose, not analysis. And he went with his gut on this one, and I think he was off the mark.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:16 PM EDT up reply actions
Scrambled thoughts
If the Royals moved Soria to the rotation and he had a sustained period of struggles, would we then say failed experiment and move him back into the closer role? Because it is that kind of back and forth that people used as an excuse for Jeremy Affeldt’s failures.
I honestly believe Joakim Soria is the best closer in the sport (even though some at the WWL still can’t pronounce his name correctly). What can we honestly expect from him if we move him into the rotation? Someone earlier said Meche-Greinke-Davies-Soria. So we can expect him to be a fourth starter?
Soon enough, we will have Meche-Greinke-Davies-Hochevar-Ponson, and I’m more satisfied with that than I would be with “Dr. Feel Bad” Professor Farnsworth closing (or Cruz). I also think it is silly to think we can just throw him into the rotation with the season underway.
Farny being Farny.
If the Royals moved Soria to the rotation and he had a sustained period of struggles, would we then say failed experiment and move him back into the closer role?
Yes.
Because it is that kind of back and forth that people used as an excuse for Jeremy Affeldt’s failures.
First, Affeldt was a two-pitch pitcher with questionable control. Fans can blame whatever they want, but he sucked as a starter because he didn’t have the pitches or control for it. Second, over multiple years, Affeldt went from starting some to relieving to starting to relieving. That’s lots of “back and forth.” Having Soria try starting for a while, fail and then move back to the bullpen to say isn’t a lot of “back and forth.” Nor is there any reason to believe that a stint as a starter would hurt his ability to be a dominant closer.
What can we honestly expect from him if we move him into the rotation? Someone earlier said Meche-Greinke-Davies-Soria. So we can expect him to be a fourth starter?
I think he’d pitch at the level of a #2 starter (not quite as good as Meche has been, but in that vicinity).
I also think it is silly to think we can just throw him into the rotation with the season underway.
Nobody said his move to the rotation would have to happen this week, this month or this year. But I don’t see a problem with stretching him out during the season and transitioning him to the rotation slowly during the season. That would be better than starting the season with him in the rotation and potentially pushing his IP up to 180 or more when he’s been pitching a lot fewer than that. What’s the downside to moving him into the rotation during the season?
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:31 PM EDT up reply actions
Back of the envelope calculations
If Ponson/Duckworth/Generic5thStarter combine for 30 starts with an ERA hovering around 6, and you replace them with Soria, assuming a 4.00 ERA for him, you’ve “saved” 60 runs over the course of the season (assuming unearned runs are similar).
Even if you take into account everyone in the bullpen moving up one spot and adding a Joel Peralta, what does that gain: 15-20 runs over the worst reliever currently there at most?
So it would still be a “savings” of 40 or so runs, assuming Soria is only a slightly above average pitcher. Seems like there’s a lot to gain by trying
If Dotel could've managed to stay healthy for more than 5 innings at a time
there’s a pretty good chance we’re not having this discussion right now.
Could be
Although it kind of looked like they were thinking short reliever with him from the beginning. If they saw him as a potential SP (who they were actually thinking of using as a SP), then I would think they would have used him as a long reliever and had him make a spot start or two in his rookie season. It’s not like there wasn’t room in the rotation for him. But I don’t know. Just guessing.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:34 PM EDT up reply actions
I remember all the same arguments being made against Soria being in the rotation
Were also made against putting Greinke in the rotation. That should be proof enough…
I never made an Anti-Greinke as a SP argument
FWIW
If anything, i would have been an anti-bringing Greinke up until he is ready to start arguer
BOOM! ROASTED!
i don't think anyone here was really making that argument
my post actually had more to do with folks poz talked to
as recently as last year
an “anonymous scout” was saying he’d be better utlilized in the pen.
I wonder if this is the same guy who thought Ross Gload was a stud defender at first.
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 2:44 PM EDT up reply actions
I think one of my main reasons for being anti Soria to the rotation
is the early part of this deacde, when we (being the Royals) had if memory serves, two straight seasons with more blown saves than saves. We had a pitching staff and an offense that consistently gave leads to our bullpen only to see Ricky Botallico, Roberto Hernandez, and countless other guys that I’ve blocked from my memory blow it.
I don’t recall if Muser was just a butcher when it came to using his bullpen, and that very well may be all it was, but I don’t long for those days again.
Like I said this offseason though…you find me a closer, via FA or internally that is good for 8/10 or more save opportnities, and I’m happy to try the switch. Without that, movig Soria to the rotation (IMO) is cutting off your nose to spite your face.
BOOM! ROASTED!
i think cruz could handle it
as could have nunez or ramirez. if hamulack didn’t have a 108.00 era, i’d say give him a shot.
What's amazing is that
even the worst pitcher in the bullpen now (Waechter or maybe Wright) would’ve been the best guy out of the pen during the Baird days.
The horrible closer history
The problem back then (most of the last 15 years) was that the Royals had horrible closers and horrible bullpens overall. Thankfully the Royals have many pitchers who are better now than Hernandez, Blowtallico and others were with the Royals. The Royals now actually have good relievers, unlike those other teams.
Most importantly, we shouldn’t let the ghosts of past bad closers lead us to bad decisions.
And smart teams don’t guy out and overspend on closers (and good, established closers with lots of saves always cost more than they are worth). Smart teams acquire or promote good relievers who don’t have the expensive “closer” tag and turn them into good closers. There are many, many examples of this. The Royals have good in-house solutions in Cruz, Tejeda and Mahay (with Rosa available to step in to shore up setup/middle relief duties.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:45 PM EDT up reply actions
I was simply pointing out that
My feeling on this are set emotionally rather than objectively.
BOOM! ROASTED!
Ok
And I really got the feeling that JoPo was echoing that sentiment in his column. It seemed like he was saying that it feels really good for us fans to know that the game is over when it gets to the 9th with a lead, so many that feeling helps the other players too.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:56 PM EDT up reply actions
It's just eerie how alike the Royals' and M's' great traumas are - like an intertwined Karmic destiny.
That’s what the all of 1996-1999 felt like for us.
But emotions are often the enemy of good analysis.
That’s why Billy Beane almost never actually watches the A’s games but follows them n a little pager (well, now his cell phone probably) (see Moneyball for the story).
I’ve often thought that if I were a GM, I’d have some (perhaps all) of the people in the statistical analysis department not watch any games. I would want their part of player analysis and evaluation to be devoid of the emotional stuff and the “he looks like a ballplayer” stuff.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 2:58 PM EDT up reply actions
100% in the scouting/tools, "have to see the player play" mode of evaluation
That kind of thing works better with prospect evaluation than MLB FA evaluation, especially when you have good scouts.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:04 PM EDT up reply actions
Indeed
They don’t even have a real stats department. Just a stats guy and some consulting. And I have a sneaking suspicion that the stat guy isn’t exactly on the cutting edge of sabermetric innovation.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:03 PM EDT up reply actions
Wow, you must wince in pain when ignorant people call you "the next Rays"
Not because you’re going to be terrible indefinitely, because you won’t, but because your FO seems stuck in the mid-1990s regarding stats. It must seem to you guys’ on this blog like one big cosmic joke sportswriters are playing on the masses of KC faithful.
Yeah really
It’s the traditionalist broadcasters who say that sort of thing. “They’ve added power in Jacobs, a speedy leadoff hitter in Crisp and a versatile utility man in Bloomquist. I think they might have all of the pieces in place now.” They don’t get it in the same way that the Royals FO doesn’t get it.
Actually, I think the Royals are stuck in the late 90’s regarding stats. For instance, they know (or at least feel) that OBP is important, but they don’t know how important it is, or that it is important for every hitter at every position, and every spot in the lineup. It’s not just important for the speedy #1 and #2 hitters.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:17 PM EDT up reply actions
and I like Coco
I just don’t think his stats support the “legitimate” argument.
The General Theory of Royaltivity
I agree
He’s a legitimate CFer. He’s a useful player and probably average overall at his position (which is a big deal on this team). But he’s going to have to improve his OBP to be a legitimately good leadoff hitter.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:32 PM EDT up reply actions
I'm really starting to like Royals Review:
I think you guys do something like this, which a Cubs fan wrote in a FanPost on Lookout Landing:
“[At Lookout Landing], and at USS Mariner, you not only roll Sisyphus’ boulder up a hill, but can explain, using cold, hard logic, why it will fall down again. I shudder at the grandeur of this achievement.”
You guys haven’t quite gotten as good at despair as we M’s fans did in ‘08, but I think that’s because M’s fans have suffered from their team falling farther and faster than any since I started following baseball in the mid-1990s. Thankfully for us, the M’s owners gotten much better (but defiitely not perfect) in the past six months…
For some reason, it seems like we react in anger more than despair.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 6:45 PM EDT up reply actions
well, it's good to see this hasn't tained JoPo's outstanding legacy too much
even if he does think Soria should be a closer based on feelings.
I’d hate to see what would happen if he suddenly started championing RBI as a measure of offensive productivity, writing about walks “clogging up the basepaths,” praising Joe Buck’s announcing skills, Derek Jeter’s clutchness, the way steroids mean that all offensive numbers since 1994 are worthless, and how modern statistics have ruined the game and Branch Rickey would never have done it that way.
If he did all that, I’d wager we’d have to call him merely an “average” sportswriter.
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He'd be dead to me
But seriously, he would then be like a great many sports writers who can put together an interesting, witty, well written column, but whose analysis is no better than the average, moderately informed fan. Thankfully, JoPo is much better than that.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:34 PM EDT up reply actions
or Joe Morgan.
Last night he agreed that OPS is legitimate because it agrees that the “best player” (Pujols) IS the best player.
In other words, a stat is NOT legitimate if it doesn’t show that whatever player JOE thinks is the best player IS the best player.
The General Theory of Royaltivity
Exactly
Of course Joe Morgan is no writer. He’s not even particularly articulate. And then his analysis…yikes. But he was one hell of a ballplayer.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:47 PM EDT up reply actions
which is what makes his commentary so depressing
he’s top 20 all-time, period. Best 2B ever, period. A guy who was knocked for his batting average while having an insane OBP.
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 4:30 PM EDT up reply actions
Kind of
He was a great innovator and outside-the-box thinker, which included some statistical analysis. But of course when most sports writers make mention of him (especially the kind of writers d_f is referencing), they ignore that sort of thing and pretend that any innovations in the last 10-15 years are so much BS.
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by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 3:38 PM EDT up reply actions
yeah
I was actually referencing the fact that Branch Rickey is held up as “old school,” when aside from, of course, being probably on of the two most important people involved in the integration of baseball (can’t remember the other guy’s name, probably not important), he was a radical. I’m too lazy to link it here, but just look up his 1852 (I tink) Life Magazine article, where he talked about him and his stats guy figuring out that 1) AVG is worthless, and OBP is much better; 2) ISo is more important than SLG. taking those two, he put together a bettter batting stat that I would argue is a crude precursor to wOBA. He also showed that pitching and hitting were equally important (the conventional wisdom at the time was that it was 70% of baseball. Good thing everyon’es figured that out), that fielding percentage was worthless, etc. In Neyer and Epstein’s Baseball Dynasties, they call the 1956 Dodgers (whom Rickey built, even though he wasn’t around LA by then) the “Boys of OBP.”
But the famous part of how sportswriters mischaracterize Rickey is when Moneyball hero Paul DePodesta was hired as Gm in LA, Bil Plaschke (and the reality that he is as well or better known and acclaimed as Joe Posnanski is on the level of Thomas Kincaid being put on a level with Picasso) talked abou the new numbers approach taking the Dodgers away from he “Dodgers of Branch Rickey.” That’s right, the writers who affect to care bout the history of baseball, the most famous LA baseball writer, didn’t know jack shit about not only one of the most important figures in the history of baseball, but in the history of his own freaking home franchise. I think Aaron Gleeman got some of his initial fame off of tearing Plaschke to shreds on this issue and getting linked by Rob Neyer.
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 4:38 PM EDT up reply actions
1952
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 4:39 PM EDT up reply actions
give it a few weeks and tell us if it's still enjoyable, or more addictively hellish
sort of like heroin
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by Matt Klaassen on Apr 13, 2009 6:47 PM EDT up reply actions
+3 for flaming Joe Buck
i hate that drunk. really. 3 years as an AM radio board op during cards games will make you understand why he sucks.
"red bull is amaZing" -Coco Crisp
oh my god
you know that little 10 second legal ID thing they do at the top and bottom of the hour? at the time (10 years ago), the small station i worked at (which occasionally did royals broadcasts) didn’t have the automatic legal ID/add click over that most people use today. one had to listen to the broadcast, hit the mic slider up, game slider down, say something brilliant like " it’s currently x degrees in downtown _, now back to Cardinals baseball on your ozark sports leader K—-" then repeat the slider move in reverse. simple, right? it gets weird when the people on the game broadcast end don’t say “lets pause 10 seconds for station identification”. Buck like to have around 14 refreshing ice cold Bud Lights and stop giving them. all i can figure is that he has a urinal under his desk, because i couldn’t leave to piss until he did it.
now, there’s always some flexibility in the legal id, you don’t break into the middle of a play, or even pitching series, but one time (of many) he didn’t give a legal ID break at the top of the hour. or the bottom. at 48 after, he drops it (just before i piss myself), i do the legal ID, rush to the bathroom and feel the sweet release. at 55 after the son of a bitch did another legal ID. i guess he was trying to catch up. i was crapping, so there was 10 seconds of dead air. about the time i get all wiped up, my boss calls in to scream at me for being so lazy i can’t work for 10 seconds every half hour (i had to cue adds at the top and bottom of innings, but whatever). thus, he sucks.
also fun, he frequently fails to hit the kill switch during commercial breaks, which is entertaining when he’s spewing slurred profanity during an ad for a local bank or somesuch. awesome. a real pro. you have to make SURE you turn the level down, but then he’ll jump back in 5-10 seconds early or late, so you always look like a douche bag even though he’s the problem.
I firmly believe I appreciate Denny more than most people, because that dude really is a class act.
"red bull is amaZing" -Coco Crisp
by grantfunk on Apr 13, 2009 6:35 PM EDT up reply actions 4 recs
why don't we just let the KC Star message board consensus handle this?
Below Posnanski’s column, a vast majority of informed readers love Soria as a closer because “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” This is a clear strategy for success…why promote anyone who does his current job well? They must apply this philosophy to their own lives and their companies’ personnel decisions: “Peterson over there’s a great fry cook and really knows his stuff, but why should he be an assistant manager? We’d lose that great fry cook! Sure you could train Sanchez over there or hire some high school kid three nights a week, but I don’t want to risk it. The key to any successful Burger King is its fries.”
They’ve even managed to avoid (so far) rants against gay people, liberals, Jason Whitlock (almost), the “KU star,” “stupid” Missouri fans, and Barack Obama. I say we go along with the most conventional of conventional wisdom and keep Soria as a fry cook. Saves are the fries of baseball. Only an amazing player can keep teams from scoring 2-3 runs every 9th inning, and even otherwise excellent relievers with sub 3.50 ERAs can’t handle such pressure most of the time.
by mikewormdog on Apr 13, 2009 6:41 PM EDT reply actions 3 recs
I love the KC Star under-article comments
I’m trying to figure out what has the most value:
A. The average KC Star article reader comment
B. The average 12-year-old’s Twitter post (is it called a tweet?)
C. An extemporaneous sentence spoken through a burp.
I think it is a 3-way tie.
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 6:48 PM EDT up reply actions
I teach 12 year olds
and you are doing them a grave diservice comparing them to Star comments.
The Allard Baird of incisive internet discourse.
by kcbottom9th on Apr 13, 2009 6:53 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
Perhaps
But Twitter dumbs down anyone (and everyone). It reduces intelligent adults to “wut u up 2?”
The immoderate moderator
by Scott McKinney on Apr 13, 2009 6:55 PM EDT up reply actions
Nonsense.
If Twitter dumbed everyone down, would The Guardian be switching to it?
I think not, sir.
This space for rent.
The Economist, which does not tweet, is a superior newspaper to the Guardian.
“Homer: Look Marge, I’m reading the Economist! Did you know that Indonesia is at a crossroads!”


















