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On Our Love Affair With the Base on Balls


The other night, our man Mitchell stepped to the plate against Eddie Bonine of the Detroit Tigers with the game in a scoreless tie and runners on second and third, two outs.  Mitch put together a fine, fine plate appearance, working the count full and fouling off some junk before ripping a base-hit to left which drove in a run before The Human Windmill worked his magic to end the inning.

I realized something during that plate appearance, though; something which really shook my faith in a sort of tenet of sabermetric dogma:

Sometimes, a walk is truly a suboptimal result for a hitter.

Star-divide

Now, in this particular case, it probably wouldn't have been terrible if Mitch had worked the free pass; standing in the on-deck circle was the best pure batter this team has had in ages, and since there were two outs -- and said batter is, well, not fast -- there was no more hazard in an infield grounder than there would be in any base situation.

But I got to thinking that there were plenty of other situations where, despite Average Run Expectancy increasing, not only would a walk have been a problem, but in some game situations, several different kinds of outs would have been preferable to a walk (and I'm not referring to the "productive out" either.  Consider:

If there had been zero or one out, a walk sets up a double play, especially with our wonderful yet unfleet young friend William at the plate.  Meanwhile, if Mitch hits a grounder in the hole which is problematic but playable it scores a run, and possibly results in a gain of two bases for the team with the runner on second moving to third.  A decent fly ball scores the run.  A confusing pop foul along the first-base box seats scores the run unless the defense is canny enough to let it go.  And if our on-deck hitter is someone who, you know, isn't that good instead of Billy... let's be serious, would you rather Mitch drive in the run yet expend an out, or walk and then sit and watch Saint Willie end the inning with the bases packed?

With two outs, an out is an out, but what if it's not Baconator at the plate, but... say... Olivo?  Well, okay, he might park a granny in the upper deck.  He might also swing at three pitches in Windsor, killing the inning with the bases loaded, and the odds of that are about 10 times as high as the homer.  For that matter, the odds of that with Miggy at the dish are higher than any other outcome, period, which begs the question: does Mitch drawing the walk actually damage the team's chances of scoring rather than increasing them?

I'm not telling any of you anything which you don't already realize, of course; we all know that there is such a thing as situational hitting, even if it doesn't actually mean what the Conventional Wisdom would like us to think it means.  But that particular situation, where Mitch was firmly in control of the at-bat and quite clearly could have worked the walk if he wanted to, got me thinking.

Now, I don't think my thought process actually alters the basic truth that "walks are good".  A guy with high walk totals is contributing to the offense merely by not making outs, regardless of any other considerations.  More importantly, a guy who walks a lot can be safely assumed to actually know where the strike zone is located (or, as Certain Players on this team don't seem to understand, that there is such a thing as a strike zone).

But once one takes into account game situations and the actual opportunity to score runs... we might be overrating the walk when we look at a player's overall batting line.  That, in turn, leads to potentially overrating OBP, and thus OPS. 

I think, perhaps, that this is where sabermetrics is still falling down on the offensive side of the ledger.  Metrics such as WPA sort of try and take this into account, but WPA is a counting stat which only takes into account the game situation at that moment, and it's also obviously skewed toward close games.  (One could argue that driving in a run with a groundout in a 7-2 game is worse, in the end, than drawing the walk and increasing the total number of runs you can expect to score that inning, but one can also argue that chipping away at the lead is never a bad thing.)  And, you know, the increase in expected runs from drawing the walk in that situation is less than two-tenths of a run; it's not like Mitch drawing a walk would inherently lead to some sort of orgaic run-scoring fiesta.

Put another way, on average, run expectancy increases no matter what when you add a baserunner rather than an out, so much so that the folks at BP insist that the only time it's even reasonable to sacrifice is if it's the pitcher or Tony Pena Jr at the plate.  Yet "an increase in run expectancy" is not the same as "an increase in the chance of scoring a run".

Understand, I am not advocating small-ball or one-run strategies.  I'm not talking about laying down sacrifice bunts or trying to deliberately hit a ground ball to the first baseman so the runner can move up a base.  I'm not talking about throwing away outs.  That's almost uniformly a bad idea unless the game really is on the line and you can drastically increase your chances of scoring the go-ahead or winning run.  What I'm talking about is trying to do something with the bat rather than "settling" for a free base, and that perhaps we really need some way to properly determine whether a hitter's actually good at doing it; at choosing to hit rather than take in order to maximize the chances of something good happening.

I had another thought as that one was passing into oblivion, too.

Is there really anything wrong with a player who tends to hit .320 but doesn't walk much, as long as he's got some pop in his bat?  For that matter, is there anything wrong with a player who hits .320 and can't reach the warning track, yet does know how to work the count and draw walks?  Sure, we'd like to have players who can hit .320, jack 30 homers, and draw 100 walks; that's called "I want it all".  But if we look at certain types of players in certain ways, aren't we focusing too much on what they cannot do?

For example, Adam Dunn gets picked on because he's a three-true-outcomes guy, and he hits for a low average.  But the other two points on the triangle are just dandy; he gets on base a lot despite not hitting for average, and he hits for power.  There was this guy once upon a time who hit for a high average and walked a lot, but didn't have any power although he later developed it; Rickey Henderson was a hall of famer before he figured out how to hit 27 homers in a season, wasn't he?

Yet we focus on OBP and SLG and ignore BA, which is admittedly a fluky and not-entirely-meaningful statistic by itself... but in context?  I think we may be looking at a situation where sabermetricians are undervaluing certain hitters simply because they do not walk, without looking at the things they do get done.  Which brings us to the third permutation of the examples above; in his best years, Andre Dawson hit a ton and hit them far, and he was pretty damned good despite not understanding how to steal first base.  Do we, perhaps, undervalue Andre Dawson simply because we overvalue walks?  I think we do.  To hear the stat crowd tell it, the only thing that matters is that he didn't get on base enough; well, there's truth to that, and in Dawson's particular case peripheral stats seem to agree with the assessment.  (In fact, a hitter with Dawson's power should walk a lot more often than he did simply as a result of pitchers trying to avoid throwing him meatballs.)  But as a general rule, I'm not certain that it works.

In the end, I think we may have outsmarted ourselves in the attempt to come up with some grand unifying theory.  Baseball is a game of situations, of pitches, of confrontations.  Every plate appearance is different, and what might be sound strategy in one at-bat might not be so much in the next.  I just wonder if players who know they have a good chance of making something good happen by hitting the ball -- that is, the sort of guys who hit .330 or the sort of guys who slug .500 -- aren't shortchanged when they actually try to do these things, because sometimes it results in not reaching base safely.

And really, let's be honest: if Miguel Olivo steps to the plate with the bases loaded in the top of the first inning with Zack getting ready in the bullpen, do you want him to take ball four, or do you want him to give GMDM yet another reason to consider resigning him?  (Well, okay, we want him to take ball four for the novelty factor, and we definitely don't want GMDM to have any further excuses.)  But really, we want Miguel Olivo to give Zack a 4-0 lead to work with, yet we don't get upset with him if he flies out to the warning track and only drives in one run.  It's a run!  Sure, when he strikes out on three pitches in the dirt, we get pissed.  When he hits into a double play, we get annoyed.  But -- and this is especially important with players who honestly don't seem to know how to take a walk anyway -- don't we want him to try and drive in runs?

Of course we do.  It's just that admitting that requires accepting something which runs counter to the Great God On Base Percentage, and that's heretical.  Well, maybe we need to examine our dogma and try to be more nuanced about it.

Disclaimers:  Although I've already alluded to most of this within the text, let's be clear on some things.  I don't agree with deliberately giving up outs.  I don't agree with hitters showing a disdain for the base on balls or displaying a complete lack of plate discipline.  I am not promoting the concept of "aggressive hitting" as it is commonly understood, nor do I have any truck with the idea of "productive outs" as a plus in and of itself.  I still believe that a high walk rate is a positive, not least because it indicates something about the offense above and beyond the value of the walk itself.

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Well, we had one of those situations last night

Olivo did have the bases loaded, and he did walk in a run, and yes, it was a good strategy.

In general, what you say is true — there are situations where a walk is not as productive as a hit (like, just about any time you have runners on base, 2 outs, and 1st base open). What you seem to be suggesting is that you cannot quantify everything, and that is undeniable. Some situations do not have a statistic for them.

That being said, statistics are a tool, and a strong one at that, for making overall evaluations of a player. Furthermore, they are too often disbelieved because of what people see with their eyes, like someone being a “clutch hitter.” What you are seeing is what all of those folks that try to do things the old way see too, and to a certain extent, they are right about some of the limits. But that should really be mitigated with a strong statement of support for statistical analysis in most game planning and lineup judgment decisions.

by bas on Sep 19, 2009 7:42 AM EDT reply actions  

actually, i think you can quantify it

i’m not sure what the exact value would be, but it was more or less proven that a hit is more valuable than a walk. this is something we all know intuitively. the problem with olivo is that he doesn’t get hits OR walk, at least not with any great frequency

by marbotty on Sep 19, 2009 9:40 AM EDT up reply actions  

My point, though

was that sometimes, a ground ball up the middle which results in an out is more valuable than a walk — especially when one considers that putting the ball in play could result in even more run-scoring goodness.

From a run expectancy perspective, here’s an example:

Nobody out, second and third: 2.052 runs
Nobody out, bases loaded (i.e., hitter walks): 2.417 runs (+0.365)
One out, RBI groundout, runner to third: 1.983 runs… including the run that already scored. Now, 1.983 is less than 2.417, but on the other hand, a bird in the hand and all.
But if instead of grounding out, the ball finds the outfield (and Dave Owen doesn’t send Betancourt to a grisly doom), you’ve got nobody out, first and third, and a run in; run expectancy is now 2.904. If he actually manages a 2-RBI single, it’s 2.953. (3.198 for a double, 3.482 for a triple, and 3.555 if he homers.)

The real question then becomes “how often does the hitter in question need to successfully drive in one or both runners to make putting the ball in play a better percentage play than drawing the walk”, which also has to take into account the importance of scoring one run vs. the importance of putting up a crooked number.

(Run expectancy numbers from Tango’s 1999-2002 matrix, which is what I happen to have handy at the moment. More current figures will, obviously, vary slightly.)

BTW, “a hit is more valuable than a walk” is a generality which should be avoided. A hit is not more valuable than a walk when the bases are empty, or (most of the time) if the hit is of the infield single variety. More accurate to say that a walk is never more valuable than a hit.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:32 PM EDT up reply actions  

Is anyone saying a walk is more valuable than a hit?

I’ve yet to read that piece…

I used to work with an old man that told me. Son, every workplace has a dumbass, if you don't have one where you work, then I'm afraid you're it.

by Warden11 on Sep 19, 2009 12:35 PM EDT up reply actions  

Uh, no...?

I’m not even sure where that question comes from.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:36 PM EDT up reply actions  

Just wondering what this paragraph means?
BTW, "a hit is more valuable than a walk" is a generality which should be avoided. A hit is not more valuable than a walk when the bases are empty, or (most of the time) if the hit is of the infield single variety. More accurate to say that a walk is never more valuable than a hit.

I used to work with an old man that told me. Son, every workplace has a dumbass, if you don't have one where you work, then I'm afraid you're it.

by Warden11 on Sep 19, 2009 12:38 PM EDT up reply actions  

...context?

Or, put another way:

BTW, “a hit is more valuable than a walk” is a generality which should be avoided. A hit is not more valuable than a walk when the bases are empty, or (most of the time) if the hit is of the infield single variety. More accurate to say that a walk is never more valuable than a hit.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:40 PM EDT up reply actions  

to me it reads like you're alluding to stat heads worshipping walks over hits.

Not directly saying it, but bringing that straw man a little bit.

I used to work with an old man that told me. Son, every workplace has a dumbass, if you don't have one where you work, then I'm afraid you're it.

by Warden11 on Sep 19, 2009 12:42 PM EDT up reply actions  

Oh, god no.

Even when the hit isn’t more valuable than the walk in terms of moving the runners, I’ll always prefer the hit to the walk; hell, I’d wager that a larger percentage of infield errors are a direct result of a fielder trying to make an out happen when the batter’s really already got the base hit in his back pocket, so even an infield dink has its benefits over a free pass.

And remember, I am a stathead; I’m just pulling a Bill James and asking a question from a different angle to see if there’s something we’re missing.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:46 PM EDT up reply actions  

I do feel like that sentiment is out there a bit

Especially Joe Posnanski. He seems enamored with the walk over all else.

Also, I think the main reason the walk is so valuable is that it’s not subject to being in play. It’s not luck when you get on base from a walk, it’s the skill you used.

by AxDxMx on Sep 19, 2009 2:39 PM EDT up reply actions  

In Kansas City

absence makes the heart grow fonder.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 3:06 PM EDT up reply actions  

Don't Forget A

Walk makes the pitcher throw at least 4 pitches, usually more.

I used to be an A's fan until they left town and got good.

by philofthenorth on Sep 21, 2009 1:29 AM EDT up reply actions  

(or did you miss that I was

responding to something marbotty said?)

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:41 PM EDT up reply actions  

yeah, missed that marbotty's comment.

I used to work with an old man that told me. Son, every workplace has a dumbass, if you don't have one where you work, then I'm afraid you're it.

by Warden11 on Sep 19, 2009 12:43 PM EDT up reply actions  

From the 2005 scoring expectation matrix in Baseball Between the Numbers:

Nobody out, runners on second and third: 0.861

Nobody out, bases loaded: 0.856

So yes, scoring probability decreases with the walk in this situation, but not much (one such inning in 200!), while run expectancy increases substantially.

Taking a walk with runners on 2nd and 3rd but 1st base open with 1 out decreases scoring probability even more, from 0.674 to 0.654, as you would expect given that a double play ends the inning and strands all the remaining runners in one play.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 1:05 PM EDT up reply actions  

Two questions for you:
Is there really anything wrong with a player who tends to hit .320 but doesn’t walk much, as long as he’s got some pop in his bat? For that matter, is there anything wrong with a player who hits .320 and can’t reach the warning track, yet does know how to work the count and draw walks? Sure, we’d like to have players who can hit .320, jack 30 homers, and draw 100 walks; that’s called “I want it all”. But if we look at certain types of players in certain ways, aren’t we focusing too much on what they cannot do?

I think all of would take a .320 hitter that didn’t walk or have the power to hit it to the warning track. Honestly, the hitter you described here made me think of Callaspo. He doesn’t walk much, doesn’t have much power, but he does hit the ball well. Has anyone really complained about his approach?

Yet “an increase in run expectancy” is not the same as “an increase in the chance of scoring a run”.

It’s not? I don’t understand this line, can you show me some numbers to make it clearer?

And my last thing, I’ve yet to read anyone bash a player for getting a hit instead of taking a walk. The Royals problem has been guys who just don’t take any walks and aren’t good hitters. It goes back to making outs. The Royals have way too many guys that make outs 70% of the time.

I used to work with an old man that told me. Son, every workplace has a dumbass, if you don't have one where you work, then I'm afraid you're it.

by Warden11 on Sep 19, 2009 10:38 AM EDT reply actions  

The difference

is the difference between “how many runs can we expect to score this inning” and “will we score at all”.

When looking at “run expectancy”, the value increases in every situation when an out is not made. For instance, even walking the hitter with second base occupied and one out increases the overall run expectancy slightly, even though walking a guy in that situation is what managers will sometimes do to set up the DP.

Why do they do it? Because while doing so increases the overall run expectancy, it decreases the chances of the team scoring at all. The reason the overall run expectancy increases despite the chance of scoring at all decreasing is because when the gambit fails, it often leads to a big inning. Even though walking the hitter always results in an increase in run expectancy, there are a few base-out situations where walking the hitter actually decreases the chance of one run scoring.

The best way to think of it is that “run expectancy” is a number of runs, while the other is a percentage chance.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:16 PM EDT up reply actions  

If I ever saw a table for probability of scoring that’s analogous to run expectancy, for any season or combination of seasons, I don’t remember it now. Is there one in The Book or on the net somewhere?

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 12:22 PM EDT up reply actions  

As referenced above

Here’s Tango’s matrix covering 1999-2002. I’m sure there’s a newer one, but since I don’t crunch numbers enough to require anything more than just a general idea, I haven’t gone looking.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:34 PM EDT up reply actions  

Baseball Between the Numbers

had both a run expectancy matrix and a “probability of scoring at all” matrix, iirc

I don’t have the book on me at the moment, and I don’t recall much else from that particular article. I am also quite hungover and feel like my brain has been replaced by a small man trying to chisel his way out of my skull, so apologies if i’m not making sense.

"You know what, I mean I cried in bed for a while, moaning 'Why!? Why did this have to happen?'"

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by DCRoyals on Sep 19, 2009 12:41 PM EDT up reply actions  

I think you're right

however, my copy is in storage, so I don’t have it handy to refer to. :/

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:42 PM EDT up reply actions  

OK, disregard what I just posted. I’ll go dig mine up.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 12:45 PM EDT up reply actions  

2005 Scoring Expectation

is on page 129 of Baseball Between the Numbers, and if somebody can tell me how to do a table on SBNation I’ll reproduce the whole thing here.

It shows that the scoring expectation (or really, probability) when there’s a runner on 2nd only and 1 out is 0.410.

When there are runners on 1st and 2nd and 1 out: 0.414.

So, in 2005 anyway, the probability of scoring did not go down when taking a walk in the situation you cited. Of course, this treats the whole league uniformly, blending RISPWTNBIABHOS with other situations.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 12:58 PM EDT up reply actions  

With nobody out and a runner on 2nd only, the table shows that scoring probability decreases with a walk: 0.625 to 0.616.

So, all together, I see 4 situations in that table in which a walk decreases the probability of scoring:

0 out, runner on 2nd only: 0.625 to 0.616
0 out, runners on 2nd and 3rd: 0.861 to 0.856
1 out, runner on 3rd only: 0.661 to 0.645
1 out, runners on 2nd and 3rd: 0.674 to 0.654

The text of Baseball Between the Numbers mentions the 2nd and 4th situations listed above in connection with intentional walks.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 1:23 PM EDT up reply actions  

It's interesting to note, though

that almost the entire discussion in the text revolves around whether or not it’s a good idea to sacrifice. And I think that while that isn’t “the problem”, it’s indicative of the problem; we get wrapped up in defending the value of guys who walk a lot and arguing about managerial strategy and all that, yet…

…well, where’s the study of what happens when hitters swing away (i.e., do not walk, and do not sacrifice)? I realize such a study is problematic in and of itself, because it requires two pieces of knowledge unavailable within the numbers: (a) you can’t tell from a stat line when a player has attempted to sacrifice and failed in order to exclude those instances and (b) you can’t ever tell when a hitter is “trying” to draw a walk.

In fact, I doubt any hitter over the age of 14 has ever “tried” to draw a walk, per se. I think lots of hitters are perfectly willing to work the count and take a walk if offered, of course, but for the most part they result from a decent hitter up there looking for a pitch to hit. I tell ya, those guys who always seem to be fouling pitches off and extending the PA? I love ‘em. I’ll take nine of ’em.

Anywho, it seems to me there’s got to be some way to mathematically combine the one-run scoring probability with the overall run expectancy to come up with an optimal sort of strategic guide. I mean, the problem with one-run strategy isn’t that scoring one run sucks; if you could score one run every inning, you’d go 155-7 or so. The problem is that when we talk about one-run strategy, we’re always doing so in the context of giving up outs, rather than in the sense of putting the ball in play. A guy may only hit .250, but that doesn’t mean he’s only got a one in four chance of promoting the offense when he swings away (with less than two out, anyway). His strikeout rate is relevant, of course, and the nature of his batted-ball data is important — the nutritional value of TPJ outs on BIP is significantly less than George Brett’s was, if you know what I mean.

But since we can’t tell by looking at the box score whether a guy grounded out to second because he was trying to get a hit or because he was “trying to advance the runner”, it’s not easy to sort it all out. I don’t object to the former, but the latter offends my sensibilities because it’s throwing away an out.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 8:10 PM EDT up reply actions  

Have you read The Book's chapter on the sacrifice?

Not sure if it exactly addresses what you’re talking about here, but they discuss (at length) the difference between run expectancy after the sacrifice and also the sacrifice _attempt).

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by Matt Klaassen on Sep 19, 2009 10:09 PM EDT up reply actions  

See, you're doing it now

I don’t care about the sacrifice. The sacrifice is almost universally stupid. I’m talking about not sacrificing.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 10:20 PM EDT up reply actions  

I know

I was just wondering, as they differentiat between the sacrifice and the sacrifice attempt — what happens after each of them

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by Matt Klaassen on Sep 19, 2009 10:29 PM EDT up reply actions  

We can estimate the likelihood of any hitter effecting each of the transitions in the run expectancy or scoring probability matrices, based on prior performance and the current situation, and weight the gains and losses based on the probability of each. Is that useful data for a strategy guide?

Even if you had that kind of data, I’m not really clear on which strategies you want to establish a guide for. We agree the sacrifice is normally a waste, and we agree that working a walk is a combination of skill and opportunity that are only sometimes both available.

If you’re not sacrificing, you’re attempting to put the ball in play and effect “something good”, and, if you’re in a certain category of hitters, you’re trying to work the count in order to limit the pitcher’s options and increase the likelihood something easier to hit.

So, what are the choices? I guess it depends on how much ability you believe each hitter has to produce specific types of batted ball.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 11:23 PM EDT up reply actions  

Thanks to Google books

I don’t have to reproduce the table. Here it is.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 1:25 PM EDT up reply actions  

That’s a run expectancy matrix. These are readily found; for example, they’re available for each season going back to 1954 at Baseball Prospectus.

But you were talking about scoring probability, for example saying that the probability of scoring is higher with 1 out and a runner on 2nd than it is with 1 one and runners on 1st and 2nd. and I don’t remember ever seeing that table.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 12:45 PM EDT up reply actions  

Ah, right

I saw “expectancy” and tunnel-visioned.

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:47 PM EDT up reply actions  

There are stats which take into account base/out and even game situations that aren't overweighted towards close games

Cf. WPA/LI and RE24

For one explanation (and links to others), see my post on Little Things, which I’ll revisit after this season is over.

I'm not a sabermetrician, but I do play one at Driveline Mechanics.

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by Matt Klaassen on Sep 19, 2009 11:17 AM EDT reply actions  

But do any of those

take into account what’s really going to happen next? In the hypothetically variant one-out Mitch situation, does anything really factor in the odds of Billy grounding into an inning-ending DP with no runs scoring when calculating the expectancy benefit of Mitch drawing the walk vs. Mitch driving in the run with an in-the-hole groundout?

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:39 PM EDT up reply actions  

Regarding situations in which it’s better to attempt to drive in the run with the batter at the plate than it is to talk a walk and leave the RBIs up to subsequent hitters, yes, this happens all the time in the NL with 8th-place hitters, who will often swing away to try to “make something good happen” knowing that the next batter isn’t likely to.

RISPWTNBIABHOS — Runners in scoring position when the next batter is a black hole of suck

Trey is very generous in spreading these situations all around the order. What a baseball mind that guy has.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 11:24 AM EDT reply actions  

You forgot the caveat

“except in St. Louis, where it happens with the #7 hitter”. ;)

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by jonfmorse on Sep 19, 2009 12:35 PM EDT up reply actions  

I always forget

that what LaRussa does counts in the record book and isn’t just a research project.

by 2X2L on Sep 19, 2009 5:50 PM EDT up reply actions  

singles are worse than HRs

therefore singles are not important

by Freneau on Sep 20, 2009 12:06 AM EDT reply actions  

HRs are worse than Grand Slams

therefore, I will not applaud for any player unless he hits a Grand Slam
(or successfully executes a sac bunt, b/c that’s what baseball’s all about)

[Am I] being sarcastic, dude? I don’t even know any more.

"The life of a (Royals) fan must be lived forward but can only be understood backward" -- Kierkegaard (more or less)

by benfunke on Sep 21, 2009 12:54 PM EDT up reply actions  

I didn't applaud Quentin's grand slam on Saturday

In fact, I muted the TV so I wouldn’t hear the YESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS!

by jbrocato on Sep 21, 2009 1:00 PM EDT up reply actions  

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