Revisiting Dayton's Deadline Deals
Some men know how to master the art of the deal. It remains to be seen whether Dayton is one of those men. While his draft strategy has earned high plaudits, and his free agent track record has earned him questions as to whether he is high, his trading history is a mixed bag. He really doesn't have any stinkers on his resume (Jorge de la Rosa and JP Howell being the best players he has dealt, and neither showed much promise in Kansas City), but he has yet to really net a solid contributor in return (Alberto Callaspo and Ramon Ramirez being his best acquisitions). Some of that of course, has to do with a poor bag of wares to sell from. Let's take a look back at Dayton's dealings in the month of July.
2006Dayton walked onto the job about a month before the trading deadline, and took that time to evaluate a laughable roster full of has-beens and never-weres. In mid-July, with his evaluation complete, he took to the phones....TO RESCUE THIS FRANCHISE!
Dayton made his first trade back in June, swapping pitcher JP Howell to the Rays for outfielder Joey Gathright and infielder Fernando Cortez. Howell had been a first-round pick, but Gathright was like, really, really fast, and therefore valuable. On July 17, Dayton sent second baseman Ruben Gotay to the Mets for minor league utility infielder Jeff Keppinger. It was a deal many criticized for sending a talented and still young player out of town, but since then Keppinger has actually proved to be the more valuable player - although we didn't find that out until Dayton had shipped Keppinger out of town.
The Yankees called about 38 year old veteran outfielder Reggie Sanders, but the Royals couldn't pull the trigger on a trade fast enough before the gimpy Sanders landed on the disabled list in mid-July. The Royals had been asking for top prospects such as Melky Cabrera or Phil Hughes, but after much laughter from Yankees brass began to drop their expectations to lesser prospects like Tyler Clippard, Jeff Karstens, Stephen White, Jeff Kennard and T.J. Beam.
The Red Sox inquired about All-Star left-hander Mark Redman, but a trade was never consummated presumably because Redman really, really sucked at pitching.
Royals fans were encouraged on July 24 when Dayton traded former All-Star closer Mike MacDougal to the White Sox in exchange for minor league pitchers Dan Cortes and Tyler Lumsden. MacDougal had electric stuff and a team-friendly contract, but had poor command, and most Royals fans realized the unimportance of having a closer on a team going nowhere. Cortes and Lumsden seemed like live projectable arms for the future.
A day later, Dayton pleased fans again by swapping swingman Elmer Dessens - who had only spent a few months with the club - for veteran left-hander Odalis Perez and two minor league pitchers, Julio Pimentel and Blake Johnson. Even more encouraging was that the Royals were willing to take on some of Odalis' large contract and use that as leverage to gain two prospects in the trade. The future with this Dayton guy seemed bright.
That trade overshadowed a deal that involved what would turn into a more valuable player, when the Royals acquired left-handed pitcher Jorge de la Rosa from the Brewers for utility infielder Tony Graffanino. The 25 year old De la Rosa would struggle in two seasons in Kansas City before becoming a valuable pitcher in Colorado.
The Royals also did their part to ensure Matt Stairs challenged the record for "most teams played for" by sending him to Texas for non-prospect Joselo Diaz.
To conclude the flurry of moves that month, the Royals won a bidding war for first baseman Ryan Shealy, beating out the Red Sox (who offered Abe Alvarez), Orioles (who balked at offering Hayden Penn) and the Cubs (who offered David Aardsma). The Royals were able to land Shealy and reliever Scott Dohmann for talented but inconsistent left-handed pitcher Jeremy Affeldt and talented but inconsistent right-handed pitcher Denny Bautista.
2007
Dayton went into the 2007 trade market without a lot bullets in his holster, having tried to send reliever Leo Nunez to the Athletics for malcontent outfielder Milton Bradley, only to have Bradley conjure an injury to avoid having to come to Kansas City. Nonetheless, Dayton made lemons out of lemonade when he sent out non-prospect Daniel Christensen to the Tigers for reliever Roman Colon. Royals fans shrugged their shoulders.
The internet was abuzz after a FedEx delivery man was seen hauling things away from the home of Royals outfielder Reggie Sanders. In a sign of the times, it was all ado about nothing as no one was willing to trade for Sanders. The Royals also tried to trade vets like outfielder Emil Brown and second baseman Mark Grudzielanek, but found little interest.
Dayton did have one attractive chip in closer Octavio Dotel, who had just signed with the club the previous winter. The Royals were asking for MLB-ready players, preferably for up-the-middle positions or pitching. The Dodgers appeared the be the front-runners at first, having two MLB-ready infielders in Tony Abreu and Chin Lung Hu (some reports had the Royals initially asking for outfielder Matt Kemp or first baseman James Loney. Hilarity ensued.) Dodgers reliever Jonathan Meloan was also involved in discussions. The Indians then entered discussions with the Royals asking for outfielder Franklin Gutierrez, but talks moved instead to outfielder Ben Francisco.
Jayson Stark reported the Red Sox may have offered outfielder David Murphy, but there appear to be no corroborating reports. One rumor even had Dotel packaged with Sanders to the Red Sox in a three way deal that eventually netted the Royals slugger Wily Mo Pena. The Yankees, Brewers, Cubs, and Rockies were all said to have interest in Dotel as well.
The Mariners emerged as a candidate for Dotel when reports surfaced they offered outfielder Wladimir Balentien. The Braves became a last-minute contestant and the eventual winning bidder, offering out-of-options pitcher Kyle Davies, a pitcher Moore had been familiar with in his previous job.
Zack Greinke - who had become a reliever in his comeback from anxiety issues - had drawn a lot of interest from the Diamondbacks, Braves, Cubs and Dodgers, but no reports of serious trade talks surfaced. Relievers David Riske and Jimmy Gobble also drew minimal trade interest.
2008
This was a quiet deadline for the Royals, who ultimately made no July trades. Their only summer move would be an August trade of Horacio Ramirez to the White Sox for minor league outfielder Paulo Orlando. The lack of movement was not from a lack of trying however.
Jose Guillen - just signed to a three-year contract the previous winter - was already becoming a headache, fueling trade speculation. The Braves were said to be interested until the Royals asked for outfielder Gorkys Hernandez. It appeared as if the Royals were asking for too much for Guillen, who had just been on the All-Star final roster spot ballot.
There were some reports of the Yankees interest in pitcher Brian Bannister with highly-touted young outfielder Melky Cabrera once again rumored to be coming to Kansas City.
Early reports had Royals left-hander Ron Mahay being unavailable despite interest from the Cardinals and Red Sox. Interest became so strong however, reports surfaced close to the deadline that the Royals were asking for Phillies minor league shortstop Jason Donald in exchange for the lefty reliever. The Red Sox also continued to have interest up to the deadline, but the Royals ultimately held onto Mahay.
The Royals aggressively shopped catcher Miguel Olivo - who they had just signed as a free agent. The Yankees were said to be interested, but nothing seemed to materialize. Mark Grudzielanek was also aggressively shopped, but Dayton found little interest.
The Cubs asked about outfielder David DeJesus, but the asking price was justifiably high. The Zack Greinke-to-the-Rangers trade rumors began in 2008 once Greinke rebounded with a solid season. One report had the Rangers inquiring about the availability of Greinke.
2009
Dayton pulled the trigger early on deadline dealing on July 10, stunning many Royals fans by acquiring malcontent shortstop Yuniesky Betancourt from the Mariners for minor league pitchers Dan Cortes and Derrick Saito. While many were simply glad to no longer have to endure Tony Pena Jr. at shortstop, the thought of Betancourt manning the position did not bring many to joyous cheers.
Brian Bannister drew a fair amount of trade interest with talks surrounding Brewers minor league outfielder Lorenzo Cain. The Marlins and Yankees were also interested in the young, cheap pitcher, but the Royals asking price was said to be too high.
Mark Teahen and Willie Bloomquist drew some interest, but nothing serious.
The Royals did acquire outfielder Josh Anderson. So there's that.
2010
David DeJesus was the hot commodity in the middle of a career season with a club-friendly option for 2011. The Royals were said to be asking for "a major league-ready prospect, along with at least one midlevel prospect or a pair of lower-level players." The Red Sox seemed to be the most active suitor, with names such as outfielder Josh Reddick, outfielder Ryan Kalish and pitcher Felix Doubront reportedly discussed and one report even linking sure-handed shortstop Jose Iglesias to a possible deal.
The Braves, Giants, Padres and Rays also expressed interest in DeJesus. The Royals even scouted left-handed pitcher Jake McGee in preparation for talks with the Rays. Unfortunately, the outfielder suffered an injury crashing into the wall in late July, and was not dealt until the next off-season.
On July 22, the Royals shipped infielder Alberto Callaspo to the Angels for pitchers Sean O'Sullivan and Will Smith. The Royals had previously rejected a deal for O'Sullivan and a "fringe prospect."
There was some discussion regarding closer Joakim Soria as it was revealed he had six teams - including the Yankees - on his "no-trade" list. Some reports had the Yankees making a "big proposal" for Soria that may have included catching prospect Jesus Montero. Ultimately, the Royals held onto Soria.
The Royals and Mets were engaged in some pretty interesting talks that involved the swapping of bad contracts. The Royals had pitcher Gil Meche, outfielder Jose Guillen and pitcher Kyle Farnsworth they were looking to dump while the Mets had second baseman Luis Castillo, outfielder Jeff Francoeur and pitcher Oliver Perez. The Mets tried to entice the Royals with a Meche-for-Perez deal (that would have required Meche waiving his no-trade clause), but the Royals did not bite. The Royals were reported to "like" Franceour, a report that turned out to be all too true. Although the talks were truly a meeting of two of the most cunning minds in baseball at work - Dayton Moore and Mets General Manager Omar Minaya - a deal was never struck. Meche went on the disabled list for good in late July and was no longer a trade candidate.
A few days before the deadline, Dayton shipped speedy outfielder Scott Podsednik to the Dodgers for catcher Lucas May and pitcher Elisaul Pimentel in a deal that took 24 hours from the time the Dodgers first contacted the Royals. Podsednik had drawn interest from the Padres and Giants as well.
In a deal that seemed a bit out of the blue, the Royals were able to package together two players they didn't really want - outfielder Rick Ankiel and pitcher Kyle Farnsworth - in exchange for three fringe minor leaguers - outfielder Gregor Blanco, pitcher Jesse Chavez and pitcher Tim Collins.
The Royals also shopped pitcher Bruce Chen and Kyle Davies, but found little interest. The Giants pursued outfielder Jose Guillen for several weeks but a deal was not made by the deadline. Instead, Guillen cleared waivers and was deal in August to San Francisco for pitcher Kevin Pucetas.
The Padres, Phillies, Yankees and Angels all looked into acquiring Willie Bloomquist, but the utility infielder was not dealt until after the deadline, as a cash deal with Cincinnati.
Conclusion
Dayton has been fairly aggressive at the trading deadline, generally looking to trade players with expiring contracts as most would expect from a small-market, perennially non-contending team like the Royals. He seems to insist upon "Major League-ready talent" quite a bit which probably puts a lower ceiling on the talent he receives in these deals. He seems to have his favorites - players he has great interest in over many seasons, that he eventually finds a way to acquire - Melky Cabrera, Jeff Franceour and Lorenzo Cain seem to be evidence of that. And of course, he does appear to trade a lot with the Braves. Memes have a kernel of truth in them my internet friends.
Dayton seems to begin many of his negotiations from a ridiculously high bargaining position. This can good and bad. It can be good because you never know if you can get a lopsided deal unless you ask. Starting from a high position can better increase your chances of getting a great return if the asset you hold is greatly desired. On the other hand, starting from a high position can deter talks, as other may find you are difficult to deal with. It can also leave you with no deal at all if you overrate the value of your asset in the market.
It remains to be seen what deals Dayton makes this year, but it is likely to be a crucial July for Dayton. He has now been on the job for five years and the fruits of his drafts are reaching the Major Leagues. He is running out of excuses and will need to start showing results or else his "Process" will be relegated to the dustbin of Royals history along with Allard Baird's "Plan."
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Some of his decisions not to trade have been truly bizarre
Like keeping Gruzielanek (twice) and Mahay.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 10:33 AM EDT reply actions
Getting nothing for Mahay and Bannister
I think are the worst moves on here. I can excuse the DeJesus non-trade since he got hurt and I think it was wise to wait til the deadline. But I don’t know what he was holding onto Mahay for. And Bannister seemed to be on borrowed time for awhile – if teams had interest in him, it would have been wise to deal him.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 10:42 AM EDT up reply actions
what was he going to get for banny?
the guy couldnt get a major league deal last offseason
Fire Everyone
by billybeingbilly on Jul 14, 2011 10:53 AM EDT up reply actions
I assume he’s talking about when Bannister was in one of his pretty good seasons.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 10:55 AM EDT up reply actions
teams wouldn't give a bag of crap for Bannister
I'm trying hard but some of this sabermetrics stuff sounds madeup.
I don't know about Bannister
He was only tradeable when he was in those seasons where he pitched well. And in those seasons, I can understand Moore thinking that Bannister would be a decent MLB SP through his cost controlled years. Then again, with Moore’s focus on tools, tools, tools, I can’t see how Moore ever acquired him at all, much less ever had a good opinion of him.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 10:54 AM EDT up reply actions
apparently he knew that burgos had a murderous side
Fire Everyone
by billybeingbilly on Jul 14, 2011 10:56 AM EDT up reply actions
Sometimes intangibles become tangible
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 11:04 AM EDT up reply actions
And how
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 11:20 AM EDT up reply actions
scouting matters!
We have met the enemy, and he is us.
by Royal Kingdom on Jul 14, 2011 12:13 PM EDT up reply actions
I understand
But by 2009 he had one good year, one terrible year, and one fairly mediocre year. I guess IMO it didn’t look like he’d be anything more than a back of the rotation guy – the mythical “1.0 WAR” pitcher. Didn’t seem like he was going to be a huge part of the future – just a fill-in until the prospects were ready – so if you can get anything good for him, you should pull the trigger.
But we don’t know if the Brewers offered Cain (IIRC, Greg Schaum thought they did, but I can’t be for sure) or what was offered, so perhaps there wasn’t a good deal to be made.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 11:12 AM EDT up reply actions
Not that it would have mattered
As if we would have just kept Cain blocked in AAA all year had we acquired him.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 11:13 AM EDT up reply actions
I don't know
If you’re talking about how Bannister looked in July 2009… By that time, he’d had one very good season (2007 his rookie season – 2.7 fWAR), one meh season (2008 1.5 fWAR – about an average #4 SP), and was having a very good first half of the 2009 season (ended with 2.9 fWAR). So I don’t see how a guy who managed 7.1 fWAR in his first three full seasons in the majors (an average of 2.37 fWAR per season) looked like he’d be nothing more than a back of the rotation guy.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 11:19 AM EDT up reply actions
I am surprised that GMDM seemed to want to hold onto someone who was
wise in the way of sabermetrics like Banny was. He didn’t seem to be his kind of player.
"Things could always be worse." - Buddy Bell
I'm sure Dayton looked at those stats
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 11:34 AM EDT up reply actions
True, but did his performance look and feel much different from those stats? Now if you’re arguing that Moore ignored the stats and merely evaluated him based on his tools, then that would make sense. Except, then why did he trade for him and keep him as long as he did? I don’t know.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 4:37 PM EDT up reply actions
He was doing much better in the first half of 2009
Than I recall so you’re probably right.
The fact he wasn’t striking guys out should have been a bit of a red flag, but I’ll give Dayton the benefit of the doubt – Banny at least looked like a serviceable cheap starter.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
I'd say given Burgos's already established issues with throwing strikes
and the fact that he was only a reliever would have made Bannister (and his ML-readiness as a starter) enticing. Clearly Bannister was an intelligent fellow. Even if Burgos had panned out for the Mets, it’d be hard to imagine him being of more value to a team that had virtually no shot at contending and no depth of starting pitching. To a crappy team like the Royals, there is a value past WAR of having a pitcher throw 150 IP, and Banny did give them 7.1 WAR over four seasons.
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 5:48 PM EDT up reply actions
Brilliant!
“Although the talks were truly a meeting of two of the most cunning minds in baseball at work – Dayton Moore and Mets General Manager Omar Minaya " – that made me LOL out loud.
That information is somewhat classified.
Seriously
Only Minaya was worse at FA acquisitions than Moore. If Moore was given more money I’m sure he could be his equal. Who wouldn’t want Jason Bay, Luis Castillo and Oliver Perez for 130 million!
by GobbleforCyoung on Jul 14, 2011 11:16 AM EDT up reply actions
for the curious... i did a series of posts on this year by year 2 years ago
2006:
http://www.royalsreview.com/2009/7/29/966548/reviewing-dayton-moore-at-the
2007:
http://www.royalsreview.com/2009/7/29/968072/reviewing-dayton-moore-at-the
2008:
http://www.royalsreview.com/2009/7/30/969627/reviewing-dayton-moore-at-the
by Freneau on Jul 14, 2011 11:00 AM EDT reply actions 1 recs
"earned him questions as to whether he was high"
LOL
But its hard to argue that trading away Ramon Ramirez and Leo Nunez for SHIT is not a horrible pair of trades for the Royals
by GobbleforCyoung on Jul 14, 2011 11:15 AM EDT reply actions
I don't know that it's fair to say the Ramon Ramirez trade was for shit.
Crisp got injured but flashed outstanding defense and a new, more patient approach at the plate.
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 11:22 AM EDT up reply actions
But everyone except GMDM expected him to get injured.
Glad I came, just wish I hadn't stayed so long.
Rock Chalk Talk
Value wise it made sense
Big picture though, I don’t know how a player with one more year (and I believe an option) really made sense for a team as bad as they were.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 11:35 AM EDT up reply actions
Would you have traded Ramon Ramirez straight up for a comp pick?
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 12:03 PM EDT up reply actions
Crisp did not qualify for compensation
and even if he did, he most likely would have accepted arbitration given that he had to take a paycut on the open market.
Moore’s miscalcuated decision to “go for it” in 2009 by spending resources and playing time on veterans is one of the reasons why the team is still not close to contending even after five years on the job.
by Gopherballs on Jul 14, 2011 12:41 PM EDT up reply actions
Misguided as it was
This was Dayton Moore “going for it.” In that light, it sort of made sense. Sort of. Still, holy hell did he miscalculate.
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 5:51 PM EDT up reply actions
Retro,
Dayton pulled the trigger early on deadline dealing on July 10, stunning many Royals fans by acquiring malcontent shortstop Yuniesky Betancourt from the Mariners for minor league pitchers Dan Cortes and Derrick Saito.
You misspelled shunning.
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 11:18 AM EDT reply actions 5 recs
Or maybe he misspelled
“anally-raping”
Kila's slash for Apr 20 to May 4, 2011, right before he was sent down: .276 / .344 / .448
by SagehenMacGyver47 on Jul 14, 2011 1:05 PM EDT up reply actions
But
he was the key component of the Greinke deal. Don’t doubt the long-term vision of DM.
Yunie is also the key factor in making the trade look very good.
Last time I looked he was at -.8 WAR ouch.
Go Royals!
"the dustbin of Royals history along with Allard Baird's "Plan."
are you sure it isn’t a shitpile?
"Things could always be worse." - Buddy Bell
Nice write up
Not a lot to deal with, didn’t get a ton in return. Interesting to see some of the same names pop up, however.
By WAR as of this offseason the worst deal at the deadline, indeed the worst deal in DMs regime was the JP Howell deal. I think the biggest whiff, however, was holding on too long to DDJ. If DM had a solid offer in hand for, say, Reddick or Kalish, he should have simply taken it. He should also have been more aggressive in moving DDJ in the prior offseason and the 2009 deadline.
Here’s the WAR writeup I did in December.
http://www.royalsreview.com/2010/12/16/1880138/evaluating-dayton-moores-trades
Conclusion:
“Of all of these trades, thus far Dayton Moore has traded away a net 15.9 WAR in performance and traded for a net 17.4 in performance for a net positive trading balance of 1.5 WAR. Only 7 of the 44 trades resulted in a net swing of 2 WAR or greater.”
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 12:02 PM EDT reply actions
I can't blame him for holding onto DJ
I think the offers get better as the deadline approaches – at least to a point.
The problem was dealing him this winter. The better move i think was to pick up the option and see if he can build on his value. And if he doesn’t, you get a comp pick anyway. Would you rather have Vin Mazzaro and Justin Marks or the 40th pick in the draft next year?
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
by RoyalsRetro on Jul 14, 2011 12:12 PM EDT up reply actions
DDJ was probably the best asset he's traded. Only getting Boom Boom and Marks for him shows he waited too long.
by BeauJackson on Jul 14, 2011 12:14 PM EDT up reply actions
It shows that DDJ suffered a serious injury
Unless Dayton knew that DeJesus was about to get injured, blaming him for waiting too long doesn’t make any sense.
Sure it does. They had him on a team friendly contract.
If you sensed the team wasn’t going to compete until 2012, why not start fishing that contract and player around as soon as possible?
by BeauJackson on Jul 14, 2011 12:30 PM EDT up reply actions
He should've been traded after the 2008 season.
Even with the injury and one year of team control, they got two potential #4/5 starters. If Moore had traded him earlier, the haul could’ve been a lot better.
by BeauJackson on Jul 14, 2011 12:35 PM EDT up reply actions
Yes.
I was infuriated when this didn’t happen.
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 5:58 PM EDT up reply actions
Unless you totally discount the trade rumors
DDJ was going to bring back far more than Marks and Mazzaro at the trade deadline. The difference between that deal and what he got was entirely a product of DDJ’s injury.
What difference did having DDJ on the team from 2008-2010 really have?
He made a terrible team a little bit better? Moore made a mistake in keeping him around. The rebuilding process could’ve been helped if he had traded him earlier. Instead he waited and the return for DeJesus will likely lead to two guys who spend their careers in AAA or with another team who gives them a chance.
by BeauJackson on Jul 14, 2011 12:41 PM EDT up reply actions
Yeah, that's the point
DDJ should not have been on the roster in July 2010, as DDJ’s trade value peaked well before that.
An above average position player under contract for three years (including a team option which removes some of the risk) at cheap salaries is more valuable than the same player with only two years left (at the two higher salaries).
by Gopherballs on Jul 14, 2011 12:49 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
That's what I'm saying
Great, he got injured, doesn’t change the fact that he shouldn’t of been a Royal by that point. Moore hung onto a non-superstar for way too long.
by BeauJackson on Jul 14, 2011 12:51 PM EDT up reply actions
I think this is a little too simplistic
A higher performing player is worth more than a lower performing player. DDJ was a higher performing player in 2010 than in 2008.
Having a player locked into a relatively team friendly contract is mostly a good thing, but given that these are guaranteed contracts and DDJ is an injury-prone player (only once playing 150+ games in a season), it’s not entirely a postive to have bought out all of his arb years.
I’m not seeing that DDJ would have brought back much more value in winter 2008 than at the trade deadline in 2010.
A good player with 3 years of team control (including a team option which limits the injury concern)
is worth less than the same player for less than 1.5 years?
DDJ has already established himself as an above avearge player by 2008, his best offensive year. Teams are smart enough not to overvalue a short hot streak — teams in 2010 are not going to suddenly view DDJ as a superstar based on a hot streak, they are going to value him as basically same the player he was in 2008. As long as player has a reasonable contract, teams get more value when trading a player with more club control than less.
Plus, in the offseason, there are going to be more suitors, not just the teams actually in contention in July. In the offseason, just about every team thinks they have a shot to contend and is willing to deal. And as a player with two full years of team control at reasonable salaries (including one as a team option), he would have value to teams even if they knew they did not have a great shot to contend that year. At the trade deadline, there are fewer teams willing to deal.
DDJ’s value peak well before July 2010.
by Gopherballs on Jul 14, 2011 1:25 PM EDT up reply actions 1 recs
There may be more suitors in the offseason, but extra WAR are more valuable for teams in contention at the break. In basic economics, all that matters for pricing is the marginal value to the second-highest bidder. Having more bidders beyond the highest two does nothing for the final price.
I don’t know by what measure 2008 was a better offensive year than 2010 was for him at the trade deadline, but it seems clear that 2007 was his worst offensive year. 2008 was sort of a breakout year. I don’t understand why 2010 (when he posted more offensive WAR before the injury than he did in all of 2008) is a hot streak but 2008 was performance worth paying for.
In the 3 years leading up to the winter of 2008, DDJ had posted a RC+ of 104. In the 2.5 years leading up the the trade deadline of 2010, DDJ had posted a RC+ of 110. Even if you only want to look at offense, he was a signficantly better player in 2010, and the increase in value from that largely (or perhaps entirely) offsets the limited decline in having fewer years remaining on his contract.
Between the fact that taking on a long-term contract (even at team-friendly prices) commits a team to paying money whether or not the player ever performs and the idea that future vale should be discounted at a very high rate (Victor Wang uses 8% and indicates that’s been used elsewhere), it is not clear to me that a player with 5 years remaining on a guaranteed contract is worth significantly more than a player with 1.5 years. Obviously, this is more true for a pitcher than a position player, but the point has value for both.
By what measure?
How about getting him for three years instead of 1.5? Where does the 5 years remaining status come from?
I was actually using 5 to try to exaggerate the difference between them
I’ll try to come up with a model later on tonight when I have more time, but a WAR 3 years from now is only worth .78 WAR today, but a dollar three years from now is close to a dollar today (thanks to very low inflation rates). So the value proposition gets worse the farther out a team goes.
I dont think we're that far off.
Bottom line, by waiting he ended up with Boom Boom and Marks. If Moore had traded him after 2008 maybe he would’ve gotten that same. Who knows? But Moore played his cards tight and risked injury, which is what happened. After 2008 that wasn’t the case. We’re both arguing in a false reality.
Yeah, I don't actually think we are either
I was comparing pre-injury 2010 to 2008 because at both of those times, a major injury was still just a possibility rather than a reality. I don’t think there’s a huge difference between what he would have gotten then and what he would have gotten in 2008, but, especially given that I haven’t seen any offers that might have existed in 2008, I’m just speculating. If wiretaps of negotiations in 2008 came out tomorrow and proved me wrong, I wouldn’t be stunned (well, I would be about the fact that there were wiretaps, but not that I was wrong).
My main point is that, in an alternate world where DDJ doesn’t get hurt on the day that he did, he would have brought back much more in return, but that wouldn’t make Dayton any smarter or stupider for holding on to him. It would just make him a little bit luckier.
Thats true.
My main thing is that holding on to him didn’t make the Royals a greatly better team. The rebuilding would’ve started in 2009 instead of 2011.
let's put it this way
What is more valuable to a team — a player projected as a 2.5 WAR player that you get for 3 seasons, or a player projected as a 3.0 player for 1.5 seaons? Obviously, it is the 2.5 player for 3 years.
And the teams are not strictly by WAR — the teams that believe in WAR are primarily going to use a projection system like ZIPs (most likely their own proprietary system) in making their decisions, not the player’s WAR number from half a season or the last season. The fact that DDJ was hitting well in the first half of 2010 is not going to radically change the projection for him — a little bump, sure, but it is not going to change his projection from a 2.5 WAR player into a 3.5 player.
Similarly, the teams that believe in the defensive metrics like UZR are not going to get hung up about data from one season — they are going to look at the multi-year data, and are going to factor in the numbers from both CF and the OF corners (probably weighting by the 10 run positional difference). A team in 2008 is going to value his defense (close in time to his good years in CF) more than a team in 2010 (far in time from when he is playing CF regularly).
1 ZIPS never projects that a guy is going to suffer a career-ending injury, but teams that are putting themselves on the hook for guaranteed money have to factor that in.
2 Projection systems usually look at the last 3 years of data with the most recent weighed the most heavily. By that measure, DDJ looks like a much better hitter in using half of 2010, all of 09 and 08 and half of 07 than he does using all of 08, 07, and 06.
3 The last WAR that puts you into the playoffs is way more valuable than any other WAR. A team in a tight race for the last playoff spot should be willing to pay a lot more for WAR than a team in the offseason. I don’t know how much more. I’ve read studies, but I don’t have them at my fingertips. I would guess that a half season of an above-average player at the trade deadline is worth more than a full season of that same player at the beginning of the year. (That is to say, I think we got more for a half season of Posednik at the trade deadline than we would have gotten if we’d traded him in spring training). The difference between 2.5 WAR for 3 seasons and 3.0 for 1.5 seasons depends in part on how much that half season of WAR to a contender is worth.
4 I don’t understand how having been able to play CF well recently (but no longer being able to) makes you more valuable than not having been able to play CF well recently. Are you saying he looked like a better LF in 2008 than in 2010? I can agree with that.
The difference in offense is minimal
DDJ 2006-2008: 286/360/420 341 wOBA
DDJ 2008-2010: 300/363/443 350 wOBA
That is the difference of a few runs, not a few wins. The offensive projections are going to be very similar.
Teams in a pennant race might pay a little more, but come on, the difference here is 7.5 wins (2.5 WAR player x 3 years) versus 4.5 wins (3.0 WAR x 1.5 years) — the pennant race team is not going to overpay for DDJ by $15 million.
The point on defense and position is that teams value CF more than corner OF — it is a 10 run difference — and teams are going to expect a younger DDJ to play better defense than an older DDJ. A team looking at DDJ during the 2008 offseason is going to value his defense and position more than a team looking at him in July 2010.
Now that I have time to do the math
The short answer is that the difference in surplus value is about $7M (or about half a season’s production for a 3 WAR player) and I think it’s entirely reasonable to expect a contending team to overpay by that much.
Running through the math:
Player A: 2.5 WAR for 3 years
Player B: 3.0 WAR for 1.5 years
If you apply a discount rate of 8%, the present value of Player A’s future production is 6.9 WAR. For player B, it’s 4.4 WAR
Using $5M per WAR, that’s $34.6M for the A and $21.9M for the B.
If we use DDJ’s contract and assume the option year pickip, the present value of the guaranteed money owed, using a 2% discount rate for money (I think this is generous considering what savings accounts pay these days), is $13.9M for A and $8.2M for B.
So $20.6M of surplus value on A versus $13.7M for B.
I’m sure a team is willing to pay more for WAR at the trade deadline. I’m not sure how much. I’ve speculated it’s more that they’d pay more for the partial year than have they’d paid for the full season in spring training. If that’s the case, for a 3 WAR player, the difference in value (@ 1.5 WAR * $5M) is $7.5M. That makes player B worth as much to a contender at the trade deadline as player A would have been in the offseason.
?
I don’t know that I agree with using NPV on WAR in that way; I don’t think I’ve seen anyone do it that way before, in any event.
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 5:40 PM EDT up reply actions
Assuming a contender will pay a $7.5 million premium is nuts
At the deadline, the contender’s option is not DDJ or nothing else.
Nor is the contender going to pay more for a half season than they would for a whole season.
They're also only overpaying for the WAR in the remainder of the current season
They’re not willing to overpay for future WAR. So even if the $7.5M per WAR were assumed to be true, it would only apply to the ~1 WAR or so left in the 3.0 WAR season.
Kila's slash for Apr 20 to May 4, 2011, right before he was sent down: .276 / .344 / .448
by SagehenMacGyver47 on Jul 14, 2011 5:54 PM EDT up reply actions
Right, it essentially means that they pay twice as much for that year's remaining WAR
That’s maybe a better way of saying what I meant when I said that they’d pay as much as they’d pay for a full season. I’m not applying any premium to the following year.
I don't think that math works
You’ve got a $7.1M surplus value of A over B ($20.6M of surplus value on A versus $13.7M for B"). The “$7.5M per WAR instead of $5.0M” assumption still only gets you ~$2.5M, based on overpaying for ~1 WAR remaining in the season the trade occurs (even if 1.5 WAR were remaining, you’d still only get $3.75M ($2.5M premium X 1.5 WAR)). That still leaves player B short of player A by several million.
Kila's slash for Apr 20 to May 4, 2011, right before he was sent down: .276 / .344 / .448
by SagehenMacGyver47 on Jul 14, 2011 6:12 PM EDT up reply actions
Twice as much per WAR is $10M/WAR not $7.5M/WAR
But you only assign that value to the remaining 1.5 WAR for the contending year. Going from $5M/WAR to $10M/WAR increases the value by $7.5M [($10M-$5M)*1.5).
I see, I misread it because that is a LARGE assumption about
overpaying for WAR at the deadline. Even so, they’re about even (but not if you figure that not an entire half of the season is left, let’s say about 40% is left, so $5M WAR premium times 1.2 WAR remaining gets $6M, so B is still short by $1M). Seems like there are a lot of assumptions without really getting any solid conclusions.
Kila's slash for Apr 20 to May 4, 2011, right before he was sent down: .276 / .344 / .448
by SagehenMacGyver47 on Jul 14, 2011 7:03 PM EDT up reply actions
My main point is not that there's no difference in value
The numbers just happened to work out that way.
My main point is that this idea that DDJ had way more value in 2008 is overblown. Even if there’s no premium at the deadline, we’re talking about a difference in value of one B pitching prospect (Sickels had Dwyer as the Royals only flat B prospect this year; the big 3 plus Jeffress and Odorizzi were B+ and Coleman was B-)
It's harder to do outside of trades with big name prospects
I went and looked at the Podsednik trade. The Dodgers last year sent us $2.6M in value for 1/3 of a season of a player that they could have gotten on the free agent market for $1.65M at the beginning of the year. That’s pretty darn close to a contender paying twice as much for WAR at the end of the season as they would have at the beginning.
Aside from 1-year free agents, I don’t really know how to test this proposition (to do it with trades, you’d need players traded at the trade deadline who were also traded at the beginning or end of that season).
Hm
That’s an interesting way of thinking about it.
Need spreadsheets.
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 6:42 PM EDT up reply actions
You don't think that they'd pay anymore at the deadline
How much more valuable do you think the wins are to them? They’re certainly more valuable. It’s just a question of how much.
And $7.5M is the value of a B-rated pitching prospect, like, say, Vin Mazarro. It’s not exactly a ransom.
Not $7.5 million as a premium on top of what they already would give up
The team would already be giving up fair value for DDJ — if he was valued at 1.5 WAR for the rest of the year and assuming $5 million per win, that would be $7.5 million. The team is not going spend double — another $7.5 million on top of that — to acquire that player. That would be $10 million per win.
And calling present day Vin Mazzaro a “B prospect” based on someone’s mistake assigning him a prospect grade two years ago is not helping.
And, again, the main point is that the difference in perceived value of DDJ between 2008 and 2010 was not going to be much different — the 2.5 versus 3.0 was a hypothetical in response to your belief that he would be valued more in 2010 based on his hot streak.
1 His 2008-2010 trade deadline performance is almost exactly 3 WAR / full season while his 2006-2008 performance is almost exactly 2.5 WAR / full season. To keep referring to a hot streak doesn’t make any sense to me.
2 The valuation of a B prospect is based on Sickels ratings. If he can make a mistake with Mazzaro, his mistakes should be factored into the valuation. But if Mazzaro isn’t acceptable, we’ll use the Royals only Grade B pitcher in the 2011 report: Chris Dwyer.
again, the decision would be based on the projection
not actual WAR. The projection is going to adjust for things like the unexpectedly low BABIP in 2007 (and the unusually high one in 2010). As Matt mentioned below, his retro projection would have had DDJ at 3.0 WAR heading into 2009.
Maybe I'm underestimating the value of a player at the deadline
I’ve been looking at other ways to think about this.
In this Baseball Prospectus article from 2006 suggests that the 86th to 95th win are worth more than twice as much as other wins (and the 89th to 91st wins are worth more than five times as much)
And looking at Baseball Prospectus’ playoff odds report, the ChiSox, right now are projected to finish four games behind the Tigers. It puts the ChiSox playoff odds at 16.3%% and the Tigers odds at 65.1%. If the ChiSox can improve their team by four wins, their playoff odds would increase by at least 20 percentage points (and probably by closer to 30 as the other teams in the division saw their odds drop towards 0). Each marginal win for the ChiSox is worth between a 5 and 7 percentage point increase. Depending on how much you value a playoff appearance at, you can calculate the value of a marginal win.
Under the second approach, the marginal value would be greater for a team that also had a realistic shot at the wild card (which the ChiSox do not).
The various models in ZiPS do take into account the chances of a sudden career-ending injury (or a possible decline in play). Because of this one-sided risk, you’ll see ZiPS long-term projections tend to have declining playing time, even for young players (especially pitchers) – the mean projection you see does factor in this risk skewness.
by D.Szymborski on Jul 14, 2011 3:56 PM EDT up reply actions
Wow
It’s cool to hear from the man himself. What input is used to determine a player’s future likelihood of injury? Days on the DL in past seasons?
Playing time and historical injury rates for position. Obviously, there will always be specific health information that a system won’t know about, but it’s not completely ignorant of downside risk.
by D.Szymborski on Jul 14, 2011 4:59 PM EDT up reply actions
Do you think he would have gotten much more for DDJ in winter 2008
than at the trade deadline in 2010?
In 2008, he had to be moved out of his premium defensive position and his hitting was down from his early outstanding years. As his contract ran down he was posting better years in 2009 and 2010 that were enhancing his trade value.
Surely.
That team would’ve been trading for a 28 year old centerfielder coming off a career year. Not sure what numbers you’re looking at, but 2008 was his peak year to that point. He also played half his games in CF that year. Whoever trading for him would’ve taken on a 3/14.6M deal, I think that would’ve sold well. Instead Moore waited and took the risk of injury, and were left with Boom Boom and Marks.
2007 and 2008 were his worst full years with the Royals
04 (96 GP): 0.9 WAR
05 (122 GP): 4.0 WAR
06 (119 GP): 4.4 WAR
07 (159 GP): 1.9 WAR
08 (135 GP): 2.5 WAR
09 (144 GP): 3.6 WAR
10 (91 GP): 2.6 WAR
per fangraphs
A big part of the decline in 07/08 is declining defense. He gets moved out of CF and into LF in 2008.
His defense was declining and that's why he got moved to LF in mid-season
If you just want to look at hitting, he’s a better hitter after 2008 than before. His improving play is increasing his trade value (which is being countered by his advancing through his contract).
In 2009, everything went down.
His BA, OBP, SLG, he hit better? I’m arguing he should’ve traded him after 2008, you’re aruguing during 2010. You’re main argument is that he got injured. Isn’t that a negative on your argument? By holding onto him, he risked that happening. And it did. Thus, you’re argument is kind of bunk.
I feel like I'm on the facebook page or something
2004-2008 RC+ 103
2009-2010 RC+ 108
Yeah, he was a better hitter after winter 2008 than before.
I feel like I'm on the facebook page
I’ve said 2008 was his breakout year, so you go and make put that season with 2004-2007.
Also, you're confusing probabilistic projections with binary outcomes
The fact that DDJ got hurt doesn’t prove that Moore made the wrong decision in holding on to him. If DDJ got hurt three weeks later it wouldn’t have proven that the team trading for him made the wrong decision in trading for him.
There was a risk in holding on to him that he’d get hurt. There was a risk in trading for him that he’d get hurt. That would have been included in any trade offers Moore would have gotten for him. If you exclude that from your analysis of what he was worth, you’re not looking at the reality.
Yes, the value is more
But the cost is also more because it’s a guaranteed contract.
This is a bigger deal for players like DDJ who have a history of being injury-prone.
Since winter 2008, DDJ has generated the following surplus value:
09 Contract: $3.6M; Value: $11.2M; Surplus: $7.6M
10 Contract: $4.7M; Value: $16.1M; Surplus: $11.9M
11 Contract: $4.0M; Value: $0.8M; Surplus -$3.2M (so far, $2M more due)
As long as he’s been healthy, he’s generated tons of surplus, but since the injury, it’s been deeply negative. If you believe, like I do, that the injury is what’s caused his falloff in performance, then, if the injury comes earlier in that stretch and, in 2009, he becomes the player he is now, the $8.8M guaranteed to him (including the buyout) still gets paid.
His $6 million salary for 2011 was not guaranteed
It was a team option, so if DDJ was lousy in 2010, the team was off the hook.
If teams thought his defense was declining
wouldn’t he have more value in 2008 than 2010?
His defense looked like it was declining in 2008
It stabilized by 2010. It’s pretty easy to see this in the stats.
teams are going to account for the fact
in 2008, he is still playing CF, while after 2008, he basically stopped playing CF — there is a 10 run difference betweens the two positions.
Just dusting off my creaky ol' crude projections spreadsheet
and I have DDJ projected as about a “neutral” OF defender (meaning a few runs below average in CF, between about 8 above in the corners) for 2009 according to both UZR and plus/minus.
Using my similar-ly crude offensive projections and adding in replacement level and all that stuff, I have him projected as about a 3 win player for 2009.
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 3:28 PM EDT up reply actions
just using the discussion as an excuse to waste time pretending to do sabermetrics
never mind me. carry on.
Making watching baseball as fun as doing your taxes.
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 3:29 PM EDT up reply actions
That's a pretty good prediciton
I’ve never attempted an exercise like that (perhaps this is obvious), but I wonder how you project playing time for a guy like DeJesus?
With playing time I usually just 'eyeball' it
with most players I got 90%, with DDJ about 80%. Remember it’s a very rough projection. These “retro-jections” are something I startedf for fun: regression to the mean, no components (just wOBA with a slightly age adjustment); I actually just added in a bit of something to regress to certian populations.
the defensive projections are even cruder.
Anyway, I generally only list projections in “half-war” intervals anymore, evne when I’m using “real” projections…
Making watching baseball as fun as doing your taxes.
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 3:48 PM EDT up reply actions
well, what "did" I project?
Nothting, since the beginning of the year… Let me get back to you in a few. I have to get out my souped-up Marcel projections. I’ll also use my spreadsheets…
Making watching baseball as fun as doing your taxes.
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 3:49 PM EDT up reply actions
Well... all the projections come about about the same
I have my spreadsheet th en also my souped up Marcels… Even at only about 75% playing time, I have him at about 3 WAR prior to the season, some combinations of methods have him at between 2.5-3, some have him between 3 and 3.5.
Part of the reason is that even though his offense is projected to be a bit lower, he had a big year (mitigated by fewer PA) in 2010 for him, and also that the projected run environment for 2011 (I just use the p revious year’s) was stingier than the projected run environment for 2009.
Making watching baseball as fun as doing your taxes.
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 4:04 PM EDT up reply actions
According to Victor Wang's research
A pitcher like Mazarro is worth about as much (or a little more) than a #40 pick in the draft. I don’t know if Marks was ever rated by Sickels.
DDJ should have been traded years earlier when his value was considerably higher due to the number of years left on his contract
But Moore chose to keep him to increase the team’s win total by a pointless two wins each year.
You may know me as NYRoyal.
by Scott McKinney on Jul 14, 2011 4:40 PM EDT up reply actions
Exactly
He was a huge bargain, with a ton of excess value, in say 2008.
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 4:52 PM EDT up reply actions
I just ran through the math above
I don’t think the numbers support that conclusion unless you assume that teams in 2008 would have paid for the offensive improvement that hadn’t yet occurred
But
You’re assuming a pretty significant discount on actual production AND a pretty significant premium at deadline. I don’t know that I agree with either assumption.
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 14, 2011 5:41 PM EDT up reply actions
The premium at the deadline is essentiall equal to Vin Mazarro
As a B rated pitching prospect, he was worth $7.3M according to Wang’s research
http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/7/20/950254/which-is-better-compensation
I don’t think that’s exactly aggressive valuation.
But, in any case, all I was trying to argue in response to your post is that, even if you don’t give any bonus at the trade deadline, it’s hard to say he had “a ton of excess value” in 2008 as compared to 2010.
The market for DeJesus was probably most bullish heading into the 2009 season.
I couldn’t believe that Moore didn’t trade him when teams like Atlanta were looking for “center fielders”
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 5:57 PM EDT up reply actions
*and then I read the insanely long discussion above*
Sporadically musing on the Royals at Royalscentricity and on Twitter at Old Man Duggan
by Old Man Duggan on Jul 14, 2011 6:07 PM EDT up reply actions
We could have gotten Gorkys Hernandez then!
That McLouth deal ended up being bad for both teams.
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
Moore has made a lot of trades swapping a quarter for two dimes and a nickel
The point of trades is to make the team better, not just reshuffle the value among different positions. This is not really a point in his favor.
by Gopherballs on Jul 14, 2011 12:31 PM EDT up reply actions 4 recs
Plus, the more coins you have
the more likely the vending machine is to reject one of them.
WTF Vending Machine — you took the first 9 dimes, TAKE THE LAST ONE!!! I NEED THAT SODA
Unless I'm wrong...
by Top Ramen on Jul 14, 2011 2:48 PM EDT up reply actions 4 recs
Unfair
Remember when he turned Billy Bucker into Alberto Callaspo who he turned into two Billy Buckners?
Pitching ex nihilo
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by Matt Klaassen on Jul 14, 2011 2:51 PM EDT up reply actions
This
is a great piece. I’m always trying to recall who came from where and for whom. Might just print this out and posterity.
I read somewhere last night that Chris Getz is the one remaining remnant from the Beltran trade. Beautiful.
Moore let the team bottom out this year, adding a Top 3 pick won't hurt.
The return was still bad. Thought Moore doesn’t get any credit for not paying Teahen/Buck.
We could of had Wily Mo Pena? CURSES
great article…..
by liquorstoreclerk on Jul 15, 2011 7:37 PM EDT reply actions
Moving the focus to this year:
According to the internet rumor mills, the Kansas City Royals are shopping around Wilson Betemit for a buyer. Betemit is a 29 year old who has an .835 OPS over his last 140 games (parts of each of the last two seasons. This is up from his career .779 OPS, and he has done it in a ballpark that skews toward pitching. According to Jon Paul Morosi*, the Milwaukee Brewers have the most (if not only) interest in Betemit at the moment. I wanted to take a look, today, at who Dayton Moore (general manager of the Royals) should go after from the Brewers’ organization.
http://mlbbuzz.yardbarker.com/blog/mlbbuzz/betemit_could_be_first_royal_traded_cabrera_next/5572141
It has been Moore’s past tendency to go after young pitching – in general and through saying that you can never have enough. I am also of this persuasion. Therefore, I will take a look at three players that the Royals should be interested in on Milwaukee’s A, AA, and AAA teams.
Dan Meadows – http://www.baseball-reference.com/minors/player.cgi?id=meadow001dan
The player that I would start asking for, if I’m the Royals, is left-handed pitcher Dan Meadows. Meadows has pitched in 26 games at the AA and AAA level this season. He has 1 start and has finished 7 games, while throwing 51 1/3 innings. Meadows has a 2.28 ERA and a 1.052 WHIP over that span. More importantly to me, out of the bullpen, is his fantastic 4.27 K:BB rate. At 23, he has improved statistically over the course of the last three seasons.
If Meadows is too much according to the Brewers, I move on to right-handed starting pitchers Michael Fiers and Tyler Thornburg.
Michael Fiers – http://www.baseball-reference.com/minors/player.cgi?id=fiers-001mic
Like Meadows, Fiers has split time between AA and AAA this year. Unlike Fiers, he is a slightly older prospect. Fiers is 26 years old, as opposed to Meadows’ 23 years of age. Fiers has pitched in 26 games, starting 10 and finishing 11. He has thrown 74 1/3 innings this year. His 4.0 K:BB rate is stellar. His 80 strikeouts in 26 games are also fantastic. His WHIP is a spectacular 0.996. Despite his age, Fiers has moved quickly through the minors, only having spent 3 years in minor league baseball, having gone to Nova Southeastern University (I’ve never heard of it either.)
Tyler Thornburg – http://www.baseball-reference.com/minors/player.cgi?id=thornb001tyl
Tyler Thornburg is another young player. He is only 22, and is in his 2nd year of professional baseball, this year in A ball for the Brew Crew. He has started all 16 games in which he has pitched in 2011, going 90 2/3 innings (5 2/3 IP per start). He has struck out a preposterous 102 batters in 90 2/3 innings and has a K:BB of 2.91. He has a 1.69 ERA and a 1.059 WHIP. Thornburg only gives up 2 hits every 3 innings or so. However, he is 22 years old and is still a ways off, in A ball. He has only had 25 games of professional baseball, 22 of which were starts, since being drafted in the 3rd round of the 2010 draft.
Seems like a pretty fair assessment of what we can expect for Wilson
Relive Royals History at royalsretro.blogspot.com
thornburg would definitely be my #1 choice out of that list...
but all 3 seem like decentish returns for betemit
Fire Everyone
by billybeingbilly on Jul 18, 2011 1:10 AM EDT up reply actions
Think I'd rather have Thornburg
Good solid basis to grow on as an SP.
by BlueEyes_Austin on Jul 17, 2011 8:55 PM EDT up reply actions

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