On May 9, 2005, the Royals invaded Canada to take on the Blue Jays. At 8-23, the Royals were already fifteen games back in the AL Central, but you couldn't tell that to the 13,000 rabid Jays fans who watched a brilliant baseball spectacle that Monday night in the Skydome.

With the Blue Jays leading 6-1, illustrious Royals manager Tony Pena -- who would be fired later that week -- sent a young Leo Nunez out in the bottom of the 8th. Prior to that season, Nunez had never pitched above A-ball, and like fellow Royals rookie Ambiorix Burgos, Nunie was a mere twenty one years young. Despite his inexperience, Nunez was unfazed, striking out Ken Huckaby swinging to begin his career. He followed that K with another, this time getting Orlando Hudson looking. With two outs and no one on, he induced a pop-up foul from Reed Johnson, and walked back to the dugout with a perfect lifetime ERA. The Allard Baird development machine had just churned out another great young reliever...

At the time, nobody really had any idea why the Royals had rushed Nunez and Burgos (who had been called up on April 23) to the Majors so soon, and nobody ever found a better answer than "well, all the other guys are terrible". (I've long held that there's sorta a reverse racism  in baseball regarding Dominican pitchers, as both Nunez and Burgos were, a kind of romantic mystique that imagines that they're all so talented that they can handle anything, while also so alien that they aren't really nervous or distracted because they probably don't know whats going on or who anybody is, while Bubba Kyle McTevins is gonna be overwhlemed because he's dealing with information overload and is still geeked up because he's sitting next to Mark Grudzielanek in the dugout. Just a theory, love to see what you think.) Burgos, it was thought, was more talented, but Nunez might also be a starter. Again, why he needed to jump from A-ball to the American League for a 8-24 team rather than working on his repertoire in the minors was never really explained. I suppose the Royals just thought that other teams had young pitchers show up out of nowhere, so that that might also happen with Burgos and Nunez, despite the fact that combined they were 42 years old and weighed 200 pounds.

The faces of Nunez.

Nunez started well, allowing just one earned run in his first five games. However, he then turned in two bad outings in relative proximity, being left on the mound to allow five and six runs respectively. After eleven appearances his ERA was over 8.00. Still, the reputation of the team's coaching staff speaks for itself, and we really cannot over-state the instruction he was recieving. Nunez was never wholly effective for any long stretches as a rookie, and ended the season with an ERA of 7.55 (although this was the wretched STEROID ERA, so that was actually a league average ERA, sincerely, the uninformed radio talk-show guys of America). Weirdly, his 53.7 IP for the '05 Royals remains his career high, despite the fact that a) he was ineffective and b) there was absolutely no point to him being out there.

Nunie's (I can't remember if we called him "nunie"/"noonie" or not) next two seasons were something of a holding pattern. In '06 he actually spent a good portion of the season in the minors and appeared in only seven games with the Royals. While Nunez had seen action as a starter earlier in his minor league career, in '05 and '06 the Royals used him exclusively as a reliever for two years. After another wave of injuries and time in the minors, Nuez reappareaed in '07. In '07, naturally, it was time to let him start again. Why? No reason really, but it wasn't like the new regime had anything to lose.

Nunez took one for the team in Spring Training, 2007.

From late July through August of '07 Nunez made six starts and randomly appeared as a reliever once. In those seven games he wasn't bad, posting a 4.05 ERA in 33.1 IP. Considering he also allowed seven home runs over that stretch, he was either lucky to only have a 4.05 ERA or actually a much more effective pitcher who'd had some bad homer luck. Nunez managed twenty five strikeouts against just ten walks as well. Considering he was still just 23 years old, was coming off some minor injuries in '06 and had never really been consistently used, it wasn't a bad beginning. Nevertheless, the six runs he'd allowed in his sixth start, against Detroit, seemed to discourage the braintrust, and Nunez would never start for the Royals again. Instead, Leo made six relief appearances in September, running off a 3.48 ERA stretch, and finished '07 with a 3.92 ERA.

Nunez made the Opening Day roster out of Spring Training in '08 and appeared in the Royals first two games, both victories. Through May 27th, Nunez was a regular member of the Hispanic Panic bullpen and one of its, well, I guess we should be horrible shouldn't we... one of the real key compadres. After twenty one appearances in 2008 Nunez was the owner of a 1.71 ERA and owned a clean slate homer-wise. Unfortunately, he hit the DL with a sore muscle in his right side. Nunez would return in late July, and while he was adequate in his last twenty four games pitched, he wasn't as awesome as he had been, posting a 3.95 ERA in 27.1 IP.

As it would turn out, Nunez would make his final appearance as a Royal during the season finale, appearing in the bottom of the 7th with the bases loaded and the Twins leading 2-0. Nunez allowed a two-run single to Delmon Young, but ended the rally with a "double-play" fly ball from Brendan Harris and a putout at home. The Royals would lose the game and Nunez would ever appear in a Royals uniform again.

So was Nunez improving? Was he poised for a breakout, or at least sustained success? Here's a big table of numbers, including the somewhat pointless '06 numbers:

If anyone wants to calculate his career FIP, you're welcome to it. It's possible that we've already seen whatever Leo's breakout looks like, the stretch from '07 through late May of '08 when he upped his strikeout rate, while keeping the walks under control. Nunez was much more effective against righties than lefties (who always slugged well against him) over his Royal career, a largely irrelevant fact considering he was managed mostly by Buddy Bell and Trey Hillman. Still, a great many of these numbers immistakably trend positive, which can't be said for the man he was traded for, our beloved Mike Jacobs. Its possible that, on the day he was traded, Nunez was the best pitcher that Moore had dealt from the team, and even so, you could debate overall the merits of Nunez versus Ramirez.

For such a young guy, Nunez made his way into a great number of Royals games and discussions in the latter half of this anxious decade, and will not leave a small entry in the eternal Royals encyclopedia. Leo appeared in 106 games as a Royal, good for 49th in team history, between Dan Reichert and Jerry Don Gleaton. His 159 career innings pitched is good for 87th in team history, just trailing current former Brave Kyle Davies. Finally, Nunez struck out 102 batters as a Royal and is tied, perhaps forever, with well-remembered 2003 hero Brian Anderson at 86th on the all-time list.

According to WPA, two appearances by Nunez stand out as his most glorious. The first came way back in 2005, in his fourth career game. With the Royals leading Baltimore 6-4 (it had been 6-0) Nunez relived Runelyvs Hernandez with two men on and one out in the fourth. Nunez ended the rally, striking out Melvin Mora and retiring Miggie Tejada to end the inning. He followed that up with a four-batter scoreless fifth and a 1-2-3 sixth, giving way to Jamie Cerda. Thanks to Nunez's scoreless 2.2 IP, he earned a 29% WPA, which he would never match in his career. He came close however, three seasons later, on Opening Day 2008 against the vaunted Tigers. (AKA the Brett Tomko Game.) With the scored tied at four, Nunez pitched a scoreless four-batter ninth (walk) as well as a perfect tenth, holding down the fort for two innings before the Royals took the lead in the eleventh, and good for a WPA of 28%.

A Marlin now, Nunez must endure the bitter knowledge that he must endure as a professional athlete in Miami.

Nunez, let me take a long last look, before we say goodbye.

*Leonel miscellania: Weirdly, Nunez leaves the Royals with a bizarre dominance over Mark Teixeira. In nine career Nunie-Tex battles, Teixeira is .000/.000/.000 with a strikeout. Completely meaningless, but the kind of thing that will get mentioned on televsion and, sadly, will probably dictate a situational usage of Nunez at some point. Leo's most common strikeout victim? Scrap-yard hero Brandon Innnnnnnge, who has four strikeouts against LN in ten plate appearances. Ever the gentle soul, there is no player who Nunez has pegged twice, only a bunch of solos.

It was inescapable:

KANSAS CITY -- The Royals acquired power-hitting first baseman Mike Jacobs from the Florida Marlins on Thursday for right-handed reliever Leo Nunez.

Jacobs, who turned 28 on Thursday, should answer the Royals' need for a proven power hitter. He had career highs of 32 home runs and 93 RBIs for the Marlins last season. A left-handed hitter, he batted .247 and had an on-base percentage of .299.

(Note: I've disabled the comments on the various Jacobs posts that have been popping up so we can have all the discussion funneled to one place. The Royals blogosphere has been abuzz about this possible trade for days, and this site has been no different.)

Well, this is right out of the blueprint. With pitching the currency of baseball, Dayton Moore has used some of his change to acquire Mike Jacobs. Isn't incredible that Dick Kaegel even included his anemic OBP in the second paragraph? As devil fingers put it today, Dayton values power at the corners... and nothing else.

A Kaegel reminds us:

Jacobs, is eligible for arbitration for the first time, and his salary is expected to rise to roughly $3.5 million in 2009.

The addition of Jacobs creates an even bigger jam at first base for the Royals, who already have Ryan Shealy, Ross Gload, Billy Butler and Kila Ka'aihue lined up there.

Now, Jacobs did hit 32 home runs last season, and is about to turn 28, so its not like they've just acquired Dougie Mientkiewicz. He could even slug .500, though in adjusting to the better league, I wouldn't bet on that happening. In some respects he isn't even peaking as a player:

I wouldn't go so far as to say he's declining, so much as he's morphing into a latter day Rico Brogna.

You know what would have been cool? Acquiring Jacobs three years ago, especially since he was paid under $400,000 annually to be Nick Swisher without the walks. Still, even at say, Kaegel's guess of $3.5 M, he's a relatively inexpensive player. He's not cheap, but its basically an irrelevant figure salary wise given that it would be hard to see this effecting additional moves, which is all that matters.

Which returns us to Nunez and the effectual payment made. Considering that there were rumors that Carlos Rosa and Ramon Ramirez were rumored to be potential Jacobs fodder, I'm happy that it was Nunez instead.

However...

However...

Nunez will be just 25 next season and is coming off his best season, having posted a 2.98 ERA in 48.3 IP, good for a +143 ERA+. Leo's FIP was also a healthy 3.75 (only two homers allowed), and he allowed the lowest LD% of his career (17.9%). Nunez may not have Rosa's potential (which also may never happen) or Ram-Ram's overall sexiness, nor is he a safe bet health wise, but he is a useful pitcher, and the Royals bullpen was much better when he was a part of it. Stay tuned for a heartfelt "Remembering Leo Nunez" post sometime this winter.

More than anything else, it comes down to whether the additional runs from upgrading from Shealy/Kila to Jacobs makes up for losing Nunez. For now, that's 80% of the issue as I see it. I haven't cruched the numbers, but here in October, that looks like more or less a wash. There are some marginal issues however, and almost all them come up as negatives. Let's run another table:

Grade: Jacobs has legitimate power and should be an upgrade over Gload. Unfortuately, that isn't really a useful standard. Losing Nunez isn't a disaster, but considering the Royals already had upgrades over Gload on hand, and that 1B/DH is the easiest position to fill, the trade just seems, in a best case scenario, pointless. Questions about Moore's ability to build a lineup unfortunately must continue. C

Finally, not that you asked, but here's my Official Royals Review Trade Deadline Prediction Proclamation: Mahay, Grudzielanek and one stunner/out-of-nowhere guy (i.e. not Olivo) get shipped.

-Trading Deadline Extravaganza Open Thread

So much for that.

For weeks I'd been warming to the idea that Dayton might pull of a massive, franchise-altering (or so it would seem) move, in size and scope, something along the lines of Teahen, Olivo, DeJesus and a B prospect to San Diego for Cla Meredith, Paul McAnulty, a C prospect, and Brian Giles's expiring contract. As someone who devotes a large portion of their time writing about the same things, a trade like that would have been a boon for Royals Review, both in terms of my own enjoyment and in site traffic and activity, the sort of mega-deal that goes from looking brilliant to idiotic and back three or four times a year. Obviously, that didn't happen, and may never. We still know very little about Moore as a General Manager, and while he made a flurry of moves during his first year in charge, that culling was to be expected for a variety of reasons.

What wasn't expected, by this uninformed outsider -- does anything like the trade deadline expose our desperate ignorance and related desire to know more? -- or anyone else was that not a single trade would be made. Not one. Considering for a moment Dayton's memorable, though potential apocryphal dictum that pitching is the currency of baseball, it was stunning and bizarre to watch essentially an entire industry end up in the same position as the Royals: standing still. Pitching currency, perhaps, like the real thing, rests on a paradox: its only valuable if you're willing to part with it. Baseball is in a weird place right now: teams continue to spend millions each off-season on free agents while simultaneously  valuing, perhaps over-valuing, their prospects and the dream of cheap labor. None of the moves this weekend, aside from most notably and most tellingly Ned Colletti's involvement in the Manny trade, was a pure veteran-for-prospects deal. If this dynamic holds, we may be in for a string of very boring deadlines. Unless a team is stupid or stacked (like the B

Returning to the boys in blue, it's impossible to know what offers Dayton pushed and what offers he eventually turned down when discussing, most obviously but not limited to, the man of the hour Ron Mahay. In something like the inverse of finding out about an unexpected pregnancy, all we know for certain in this case is that nothing happened. The significant caveats of ignorance aside, Dayton deserves at least mild criticism for failing to move some combination of Mahay, Nunez or even Ramon Ramirez. Reliever performance is extremely variable, potentially even inherently so, and in not selling high on the trio mentioned above, Dayton made an implicit bet that, for his guys at least, that won't be the case. Sadly, just looking around our own division, from the ever-changing fortunes of Juan Rincon, Rafael Betancourt, Jimmy Gobble, Joel Peralta, LaTroy Hawkins, Andy Sisco, Shingo Takautsu and on and on, we can see that it is.

Crucially, if Dayton is truly adept at putting together a bullpen, then he needs to fully leverage that skill rather than doing it once and standing still. Trade Ramon Ramirez now, then find the next version, along with another asset in your pocket. It would be an ironic, although not uncommon, bit of professional failure if Dayton merely turned his initial finds into fixed, high-priced known commodities. A case can be made that Nunez and Ramirez are too cheap to part with lightly and that they will be so for years to come. As for Mahay, unless the Royals think they desperately need him for 2009, it remains very difficult to see the point.

The hesitance to flip any of his relievers relates to another concern going forward: the roster isn't near good enough to see so little movement. Joey Gathright should have either been traded or offered an assignment to Omaha a year ago, for example. Not only that, but Moore has also voluntarily extended the Royal legacies of, most infamously, Ross Gload and Mark Grudzielanek. We've talked enough about Gload in the past few days, but we've long been resigned to his inexorable presence. Grudzielanek, on the other hand, has now been trade bait/trade rumor bair for three straight seasons, a staggering number. As a player, in the present tense, Grudzielanek isn't really a problem: he's hit .300/.340/.413 as a Royal with good defense and a mediocre health record. That line doesn't kill you at second base, but it also isn't pushing the Royals closer to contention. Essentially, its one spot in lineup where they aren't losing ground, which is an unsatisfying form of victory. Weirdly, he's "developed" into the team's #3 hitter, which, much as if I was named the best looking guy at a party, says more about his manager and his teammates than it does about him. Grudz is a hard-player to really get excited about as a fan: there is no positive arch here, either for him or the franchise. The ultimate stopgap. Watching Mark Grudzielanek is like wasting two hours watching Daylight on USA on a Saturday afternoon. Well, at least you weren't asleep.

Grudz is a batting average and doubles guy with no speed at this point in his very well-compensated life, and maybe that just isn't good enough anymore. Still, it's difficult to see him as much different than Ray Durham, who fetched cash and two minor leaguers from the Brewers. When Grudz signed with the Royals in December of 2005, did anyone, anyone think that he'd still be a Royal on August 1, 2008? 2008! After skipping from LA to Chicago to St. Louis (talk about a steady decline) it looked like Grudz had fully entered the Reggie Sanders/Greg Maddux postion of his career, only that never happened. By the time this season ends, he'll likely be north of 350 games played as a Royal, a significant number in his career history and the history of the franchise.

Mark Grudzielanek's Career

And so, here we are. Mahay now, Nunez now, Grudzielanek now, Teahen now, Olivo now. Bannister now, Davies now.

If Joakim Soria, the eternal waiting for the Gordon/Butler breakout, and the days when Greinke starts aren't enough for you after 109 games, we do have one fascinating new thing to enjoy.

The final two months of the MItch Maier Era.

Last week, we took a look back at the changes Dayton Moore has made to the big league roster since taking over during the 2006 season, specifically the position players. Part II examines the pitching staff, which has been subject to a much more radical transformation.

Dayton Moore inherited a bad team in 2006. The Royals would only win 62 games, which was actually their highest win total in three season. The '06 Royals couldn't hit, were bad defensively and were terrible on the mound. Although Moore's earliest moves were aimed at upgrading the offense (Gathright, amazingly, and Shealy) it quickly became apparent that his top priority was building a pitching staff. And for good reason, for while the offense was bad (12th in the AL in runs scored), the '06 pitching staff was legitimately worthy of the label "historically bad".

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The Royals went 10-19 in May, thanks in large part to an offense that was among the worst in the American League. The pitching staff, after a flaming hot start however, was not blameless either, as Royal hurlers have struggled for well over a month now. While overall the team's pitching numbers have been trending downward for a long time, the Royals nevertheless posted a slightly better monthly ERA in May (4.41) than they did in April (4.78).

Before looking at the May splits, it's worthwhile to take a look at the starter/bullpen breakdowns for the entire season.

There's a lot to digest there, and I didn't even include K/9 or HR data, for the sake of clarity. First, it looks like the starters are getting killed by BAA (bad defense?) because their control of the strikezone is surprisingly good, second-best in the AL in fact, behind only Oakland. The bullpen's K/BB number is also good, although only fourth best in the league, but they've also allowed fewer hits, contributing to a better ERA. Second, I'm stunned to see that the best Royal bullpen in decades has already fallen behind league average, a shocking development that does not reflect well on Trey Hillman's usage patterns, considering the number of good options he has to work with. Bullpen management is perhaps the area in which the manager has the most impact on a team's performance, and to this point, it would be hard to say that Hillman has done well there. In Hillman's defense (somewhat), the bullpen has been hit hard by the longball (18 allowed, fourth most in the league). Overall, the Royals rank 6th in strikeouts, rarefied air for a franchise that has spent most of the decade finishing somewhere between 12th and 14th, year after year.

Before we head-off to the land of individual performance (great wines there, by the way, but the roads are terrible) let's take a look at the staff numbers month by month:

Again, since the beginning of April was so superb, I don't think anyone would guess that actually, the pitching improved across the board in May. One final note on the overall pitching numbers: the Royals have only allowed 10 unearned runs, which is one of the lowest totals in the AL. This either means the Royals have been lucky in how they've timed their errors or that the staff has actually been a tick better than some AL staffs who have hidden lots of bad pitching behind "unearned" runs. The Twins for instance, have allowed over 30 invisible runs, at least in terms of ERA.

Here are the May numbers for the starters, sorted by innings pitched:

Gil Meche put in a very quiet, effective May, truly anchoring the staff, but his gains were offset by meltdowns by Bannister (although his nice Sunday start is obviously not in these numbers) and Tomko. Hochevar and Greinke were so-so, although I'm not quite sure how Greinke allowed so many runs, in spite of a lowish WHIP and decent strikeout numbers. Also, take a look at Banny's numbers: he's been striking out more guys than the mythology around him (and his detractors) would suggest. It's not as if he's 2004 Jimmy Gobble or anything.

And about that guy Gobble, here are the May reliever numbers, sorted again by IP:

Wow, four homers allowed by Peralta, eh!?!? Was anybody expecting to see Ramirez's May ERA that high? Like a few staff pitchers, his overall ERA still looks low, because he logged all those 0.00 ERA innings to start the season. It's fairly clear that Ramirez torpedoed the pen this month, and the sooner Hillman realizes the league may be catching up to him, the better. Likewise, did anyone notice that Yabuta had a decent month? Or that Nunez, whom I sorta thought was fading -- posted a 0.84 ERA in May?

Baseball Prospectus keeps a stat called Leverage, which keeps track of how important the situations a reliever's usage have occurred in. Guess which reliever has the highest leverage score in Hillman's pen? Brett Tomko, of course. As for more used relievers, the leverage rankings go like this: Nunez, Soria, Ramirez, Mahay, Gobble, Nomo, Peralta, Yabuta and Musser. Ideally, at the end of the season, we'll see Soria #1 (not third) and possibly Mahay higher in the chain.  For what it's worth, according to BP's numbers Yabuta, Gobble, Tomko and Peralta have all been below average relievers, and Tomko & Peralta have also been below replacement level. Oh, and Nomo, of course, but he's gone.

Lastly, a word about defense. BP's defensive efficiency stat rates the Royals as the 10th best defense in the American League, with a D-Eff of 0.699 , i.e., 69.9% of the balls in play have been turned into outs by the defense. The Rays lead the league at 72%. The Mariners are last at 68.2%. (Again, the closeness of these numbers should tell you something about the essential realities of the game: 30% of balls in play become hits, give or take a percent.) According to the numbers at the Hardball Times, the Royals have the second-worst defense in baseball however, just ahead of the Mariners.

Thanks to a dominant bullpen, the Royals are 4-2. In seventeen innings pitched, members of the K.C. 'pen have posted an absurd 1.06 ERA. So yea, if every member of the bullpen is going to perform like vintage Eric Gagne, then no, none of this silly whining about hackfest will matter.

The numbers are after the jump.

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One of the old arguments I used to have with my girlfriend was about whether following sports was somehow better than following celebrities, or being a hardcore movie buff, or whatever. It wasn't contentious or anything like that, just something that became a discussion. In defense of sports, which actually most of the time I find to be quite boring and even annoying, I trotted out the standard line that the games, unlike a television show, aren't scripted, which always brings us back. In this case, I consider that to be a cliche that happens to be true. And it's hard to find a more random game, at the microlevel, than baseball.

We got a taste of that yesterday.

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Over 1,000 comments, huh? Talk about setting the tone for the next 161 games. Now lets get a win and move into first place.

 [Note by royalsreview, 03/31/08 4:48 PM EDT ]

And now, you can consider this your postgame celebration thread as well. Trey-mendous work by the bullpen, including our man Tomko.

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