FanPost

"Tear It Down"? Why the 'Astros Model' Isn't What You Think It Is

Ray Carlin-USA TODAY Sports

As the Cain-Hosmer-Moose era comes to a close for the Royals in inglorious fashion, many of us see the next few years as bleak. Many are frustrated that the team was in position in late July for one last playoff run, only to have their "buy" moves backfire and lose the opportunity to sell.

"TEAR IT ALL DOWN!" is the rallying cry of more than one Royals fan now, wanting to trade away anyone of value, including Danny Duffy, Salvador Perez, Kelvin Herrera, and even Whit Merrifield. The model is obvious. "Look at the Astros!" is all the proof that's needed.

This post isn't meant to completely discredit the idea of a complete sell-off. It's a reality check for those who think that the Astros almost unimaginable low points (106, 107, and 111 losses over three straight years) is directly responsible for their 100-win campaign this year and current bright future.

In my view, if the tear-down were directly responsible, the players currently contributing to the 100-win team ought to be largely (1) Prospects received in return for declining veterans,(2) High draft picks that would not have been available had the team not been terrible, or (3) veterans acquired for those prospects.

So let's test that theory. I am going to go through every player on the current team that has more than 1.0 bWAR this season, and we will see how they came to the Astros. At the end of each player, we will grade whether they are (1) Definitely (or probably) acquired because of the tear-down, (2) Maybe acquired as a result of the tear-down, or (3) Definitely/probably not a result of the tear-down. Then we'll tally each category in the end.

Jose Altuve (8.3 bWAR, amateur free agent)

The Astros got the biggest piece to their championship puzzle by taking a chance that a Venezuelan kid who might reach 5'6" in his spikes could actually play some baseball. He debuted at the very beginning of the sell-off as a 22-year-old curiosity, made the All-Star team the next season as the obligatory Astro, had a mediocre 2012, then ripped off four 200+-hit seasons in a row, and ought to win the MVP this year. He has two team options left on his contract for the next to years at $12.5 million total. Is he a product of tanking? Definitely No.

(In fact, there was a time when people we very confused as to why they weren't trading him, too. If they traded everyone of value, he would be gone.)

Carlos Correa (5.5 bWAR, #1 overall pick in 2012)

Correa is the first #1 overall pick the Astros "earned" through tanking. He was a "value" pick that allowed the Astros to save slot money for other picks. He might have been available as low as #5, so it's possible a merely bad season (rather than a 106-loss season) might have netted the same result. Still, he counts as a point in favor of tanking. Probably Yes.

George Spinger (4.9 bWAR, #11 overall pick in 2011)

Springer was drafted after a 2010 season where the 76-86 Astros began to sell but did not commit to the full tank. They traded Lance Berkman and Roy Oswalt that year, but held on to veterans of varying value like Carlos Lee, Michael Bourn, Hunter Pence, Brett Myers, Wandy Rodriguez, Brandon Lyon, and Jeff Keppinger. Had they gone "full tank" earlier, they might have ended up with a top-5 "gem" like Danny Hultzen or Bubba Starling. Definitely No.

Josh Reddick (4.4 bWAR, free agent)

Reddick was signed as a free agent before this year. Definitely No.

Marwin Gonzalez (4.2 bWAR, trade)

Gonzalez was a non-prospect, light-hitting shortstop, acquired after he was selected in the rule 5 draft. The price was a pitcher that has spent almost his whole career in the Mexican League (and never the Majors). He has blossomed into a super-utility, switch-hitting stud. One might argue that the only reason the Astros grabbed him was that they had to put someone on the field, but that's a stretch. I'll be generous. Maybe.

Alex Bregman (3.9 bWAR, #2 overall pick in 2015)

When their #1 pick from 2014 (Brady Aiken) didn't sign, they received the #2 pick in 2015 as compensation. The Astros are much, much better off with Bregman, as Aiken has shown nothing in the minors. Sort of got lucky here, since they were still drafting long-term in 2014 and more short-term in 2015. Definitely Yes.

Yuli Gurriel (2.5 bWAR, free agent)

Signed to a multi-year contract as an international free agent last year, Gurriel's arrival had nothing to do with the tank job. Definitely No.

Jake Marisnick (2.0 bWAR, trade)

This one is a tough call. Marisnick was acquired in a strange trade where the Astros traded young pitcher Jarred Cosart and Enrique Hernandez for him and a couple of other guys. This trade happened at the beginning of the build-up period, but seemed like more of "sell." Cosart was the key piece they received for Hunter Pence, who was traded at the beginning of the sell-off. Probably Yes.

Evan Gattis (1.5 bWAR, trade)

The main piece going to Atlanta for Gattis was Mike Foltynewicz, who was drafted in 2010, before the sell-off started. There was also a 2nd-rounder from 2013 and a 4th-rounder from 2012. Probably No.

Brian McCann (1.1 bWAR, trade)

Both players sent to the Yankees for McCann were international signees. Definitely No.

On to pitchers...

Dallas Keuchel (4.0 bWAR, 7th round pick, 2009)

Keuchel was a 7th-round pick following a season when the Astros were still trying to contend. Definitely No.

Brad Peacock (3.0 bWAR, trade)

Peacock was part of the return for Jed Lowrie, who was a surprising "sell" following a decent season with the Astros. Lowrie was acquired for Mark Melancon. Trading Melancon for Lowrie and then Lowrie for the package that brought them Peacock and Chris Carter was a big example of the Astros' commitment to keep selling until they were ready to win. Probably Yes.

Justin Verlander (1.8 bWAR, trade)

Yes, in five whole starts, Verlander is already 3rd on the team in pitching WAR. Verlander was acquired for three prospects. One is an international signee. The two prospects were drafted in 2015 and 2016, none earlier than #37. The tanking era was over by then. Definitely No.

Ken Giles (1.8 bWAR, trade)

Giles demanded a huge prospect haul, including #1 overall pick from 2013, Mark Appel. The primary target for the Phillies seemed to be Vince Velasquez, however, who was a 2nd-rounder from before the tanking era. Brett Olberholtzer was also included, and he was acquired in the Michael Bourn deal that (along with the Hunter Pence deal) really kicked off the complete sell-off. Probably Yes.

Chris Devenski (1.7 bWAR, trade)

He was a PTBNL in the Brett Myers trade in 2012. That was technically a sell-off trade, but he was a throw-in to the deal. Hard to give the sell-off full credit here, as he was pretty freely available. Maybe.

Charlie Morton (1.7 bWAR, free agent)

Morton signed as a free agent this past off-season. Definitely No.

Lance McCullers (1.2 bWAR, #41 overall in 2012)

McCullers was drafted in the same first round as Carlos Correa. He was a compensatory pick for losing Clint Barmes to free agency. Barmes was coming off a decent season and it's possible that they would have tried to re-sign him if they weren't tanking, but he was 33 years old. Maybe.

Collin McHugh (1.1 bWAR, claimed on waivers)

Both McHugh and Will Harris (0.8 bWAR, so he missed the cut for this experiment) were savvy waiver-wire pick-ups. Tanking might have given them waiver-claim priority, but it's a big stretch to credit tanking for these guys. Probably No.

So let's add it up:

Definitely/Probably Yes (Correa, Bregman, Marisnick, Peacock, Giles): 16.2 WAR

Maybe (Gonzalez, Devenski, McCullers): 7.1 WAR

Definitely/Probably No (Altuve, Springer, Reddick, Gurriel, Gattis, McCann, Keuchel, Verlander, Morton, McHugh): 31.3 WAR

Of the other major contributors this year like Will Harris, Carlos Beltran, Luke Gregerson, Mike Fiers, Tony Sipp, and Michael Feliz, none of them were brought onto the team as a result of tanking.

Meanwhile, the Astros 3-year hiatus from anything resembling an attempt to win resulted in a complete loss of fan interest. The team pulled a 0.0 rating at one point. The TV contract was in constant limbo until after the playoff season of 2015.

The Astros record-setting futility did bring them significant return. 14-23 WAR is nothing to sneeze at. But we have to remember that others would have been drafted and acquired in these players' places, by the same people who spotted hidden gems like Keuchel, Altuve, Gonzalez, Devenski, and Harris. There's a good chance that a lot of that value would have been recovered in other places.

What does this mean for the Royals? It means that selling won't matter unless it's done well. The Astros aren't good because they sucked for four years. They are good because they made one great pick at the top of the draft, already had drafted a star in Springer, and had some stars emerge who had no pedigree at all. Then they built around that.

It also means that they might not lose much for not going all-out to suck and get high picks. There are stars throughout the first round, if teams are smart and fortunate enough to find them. It doesn't matter where you pick if you're going to pick Brady Aiken or Christian Colon.

There are other factors, too, of course. Pretty much none of the value came from the trading their veterans. Marisnick came indirectly from Hunter Pence. Devenski was a throw-in in a trade for Brett Myers. That's it. And the Astros had more and better trade chips than the Royals do.

The Astros kind of lucked out that this worked for them. Without non-prospects and guys already in their system, they would be about the level of this year's Royals.

I don't really know what the best course of action is, but the narrative that the Astros' path proves that a complete tear-down is the best and only option does not match the reality of how the Astros have been built.

This FanPost was written by a member of the Royals Review community. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the editors and writers of this site.